Judgment:
1. This appeal is preferred by M/S J.L. Morison (India) Ltd., (for short 'the company') aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dtd. 17-4-1998 passed in WP No. 29505/1996.
2. Facts in brief are as under;
The Company M/S J.L. Morison (India) Ltd., is engaged in the manufacture of Sutures. Due to compelling circumstances, management suspended its manufacturing operations. Labour department initiated conciliation proceedings, Conciliation ended in failure. The Government construed suspension of operations as lockouts, prohibited the same, vide its order dtd 1-1-1996. The prohibitory order was challenged in WP No. 1574/1996. In the meantime, the company made an application dtd 19-2-1996 to the State Government under Section 25(O) of the ID Act and sought permission to close down its undertaking at Bangalore. The same was rejected by the Government. The said order of rejection was challenged in this Court in WP No. 19042/1996. Thereafter a show cause notice dtd 27-6-1996 was issued to the company to show cause as to why recovery certificate should not be issued to the second respondent for recovery of salaries of the employees for the period from 1-12-1995 to 31-5-1996 was issued. Show cause notice was replied stating that right from 1-12-1995 the company suspended manufacturing operations and the said suspension continued even as on 31-8-1996 and as such no recovery could be ordered. A personal hearing was sought for. Thereafter without hearing a recovery certificate was issued claiming a sum of Rs. 20,77,276,67ps. Aggrieved by the said certificate appellant filed a writ petition in WP No. 29505/1996. Learned Single Judge after hearing rejected the writ petition on 17-4-1998. He also dismissed two other petitions in terms of a common order. In this appeal, appellant - company is before us challenging the order rejecting the case of the petitioner in WP No. 29505/1996.
3. Sri Kasturi, Learned Senior counsel for the appellant would say that the appellant has suspended its operation since 1-12-1995 and the same is continued as on 31-8-1996. Learned Counsel would therefore say that Recovery Certificate could not have been issued for the said period. He would also say that explanation submitted by the company has not been adverted to or considered in the matter. He finds fault with the order of the learned Single Judge. He says that the jurisdiction under Section 33(c)(1) is a limited one and in such limited jurisdiction no determination is possible or permissible in the given set of facts. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondents would support the order.
4. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties. We have carefully perused the material on record.
5. It is seen from the material on record that a show cause notice was issued for recovering salaries of the employees for the period from 1-12-1995 to 31-5-1996. It is also stated in the said notice that the said recovery was sought to be made in the light of rejection of the closure application by the Government Learned single Judge accepted the recovery certificate for the period subsequent to 9-4-1996 in the impugned order. Let us see as to whether the finding of the learned Single Judge is sustainable in terms of the arguments advanced before us.
6. Industrial Disputes Act is a special Act providing for remedies in respect of industrial matters. Industrial Disputes Act is an Act providing for investigation and settlement of Industrial Disputes, Chapter 7 deals with miscellaneous matters. Section 33(c) of Chapter 7 provides for money due from an employer. Section 33(c)(1) provides for an application to the appropriate Government for recovery of the money due to the workmen and in the event of satisfaction on the part of the Government, the government would issue a certificate to the revenue authorities for the purpose of recovery as arrears of land revenue. Section 33(c)(2) provides for an application being made to the Labour court in the event of no entitlement available to the workman to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money.
7. Courts have considered the scope of Section 33(c)(1) and Section 33(c)(2) in various judgments.
In 1978 1 LLJ 167 the Supreme court has ruled that on a plain reading of the wordings of the Statute it would be found that where any workman is entitled to receive from any employer any money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due, then the question may be decided by the labour court.
In 1968 1 LLJ 6 the Supreme Court has ruled as under;
From the decided cases on the question as to the scope of Section 33(c)(2), the following propositions are deducible.
l. xxx
2. xxx
3. Section 33(c) which is in terms of similar to those in Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision.
4. Section 33(c)(1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement, or under Chap V-A of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about its computation. But Sub-section (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefits it applies where such benefits though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation.
5. Section 33(c)(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefits to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefits on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests.
6. The fact that the words of limitation used in Section 20(2) of the ID (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950, are omitted, in Section 33(C)(2) shows that the scope of Section 33(c)(2) is wider than that of Section 33(c)(1). Therefore, whereas Sub-section (1) is confined to claims arising under an award or settlement or Chap.V-A claims which can be entertained under Sub-section (2) are not so confined to those under an award, settlement or Chapter V-A.
8. From these judgments what is clear to this Court is that there is a different jurisdiction under Section 33 (c)(1) and 33(c)(2) of the ID Act Under Section 33(c)(2) the labour court can adjudicate with regard to 'money due' in terms of the statute. Under Section 33(c)(1) the Government can issue a recovery certificate in the event of its satisfaction at the hands of the Government. What is argued before us is that the learned single Judge could not have accepted the certificate in the light of a dispute with regard to entitlement in terms of the submissions.
9. Admitted facts would reveal of an application having been filed for closure by the management. The same was rejected. Admitted facts would further show that the company has chosen to suspend its operations and even after rejection of the closure, the company did not make any payment to its employees. It was in those circumstances workmen sought assistance of the Government in the matter of money due to them and the Government has chosen to issue the certificate.
10. Learned Single Judge in the impugned order has noticed the rival submissions and thereafter he has noticed that on 27-11-1995 management resorted to laying off of 66 workmen. Lay off was revoked on 1-12-1995. An application for permission to closure was filed on 19-2-1996. It was proposed to effect from 25-5-1996. The Government rejected the application on 9-4-1996. Learned Single Judge ruled that after 9-4-1996 i.e., the date of rejection of the closure order, the management could not have continued the suspension operation and any continuation would be in violation of Section 25(O) of the ID Act. In this view of the mater, learned single Judge accepted the case of the workmen. To consider the acceptance of the finding of the learned Single Judge, this Court has to notice Section 25(O) of the Act for the purpose of this appeal.
11. Section 25(O) provides for closure with prior permission, A detailed procedure has been prescribed for the purpose of closure. Section 25(O)(1) provides for an application in a prescribed form. Section 25(O)(2) provides for an heating in the matter. Section 25(O)(3) provides for deemed permission and Section 25(O)(4) provides a finality to the order. A review power is also available in terms of Section 25(O)(5). Section 25(O)(6) is necessary for the purpose of this appeal. It reads as under;
Where no application for permission under Sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.
From a reading of Section 25(O)6 what is clear to us is that the closure of the undertaking would be illegal subsequent to the date of refusal by the Government. It makes further clear that the workman would be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.
12. The argument of Sri K. Kasturi, learned Counsel for the management is that the suspension operation would be a defence to Section 25(O)6 and that therefore there is a dispute and hence no certificate could have been issued under Section 33(c)(1) of the Act. We are afraid that such technical arguments cannot be accepted in a matter like this, particularly in the light of the laudable object of the ID Act. This Court cannot forget that the Industrial Disputes Act is a social welfare legislation, Several statutory measures have been provided for the purpose of welfare of the workmen in terms of the statute. If the argument of the company is accepted then the statutory object under Section 25(O)6 gets defeated or diluted. This Court cannot accept such destructive argument. Therefore we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly chosen to reject the case of the management in the light of Section 25(O) (6) of the Act. Suspension of operation after rejection of Section 25(O) application gets eclipsed for the purpose of wages. Management cannot adopt suspension of operation argument after first request of closure application. There exists no dispute for determination on the facts of this case. The jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(1) has rightly been exercised by the Government and it is rightly accepted by the learned Single Judge. We must also notice that the learned Single Judge is fair in accepting the certificate only from 9-4-1996 i.e., the date of rejection of closure order. The earlier period is left out by the learned Single Judge for a decision in a manner known to law and in accordance with law. On the facts of this case and in the given circumstances, we have no hesitation in accepting the order of the learned Single Judge.
13. In the result, this writ appeal stands rejected. The order of the learned Single Judge dtd. 17-4-1998 in WP. No. 19042/1996 is confirmed. Any payment to be made to the workmen in terms of this order is subject to adjustment. Deposit if any made is subject to adjustment with regard to payment. Any deposit made in this Court is ordered to be made over to the Deputy Labour Commissioner of the Region. Time for balance if any to be made over in terms of this order to the Deputy Labour Commissioner, is two months from today. The Deputy Labour Commissioner is to make over the payment to the workmen after satisfying himself with regard to the identity of workmen in question and disburse the amount in accordance with law.