Judgment:
V. Dhanapalan, J.
1. The injured-claimant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Additional District Court, Fast Track Court No. 4, Coimbatore at Tiruppur, is the appellant herein and he has challenged the order dated 21.3.2003 passed by the Claims Tribunal in M.C.O.P. No. 577 of 1998.
2. Before Claims Tribunal, it was the case of the claimant that on 11.12.1997 at about 6.45 p.m., when he was riding the scooter bearing registration No. TLB 2572 in Coimbatore NSR Road near Bharathi Park junction, bus belonging to the Transport Corporation, came from behind and dashed against the scooter thereby causing fracture in his right hand and abrasions all over his body. It was his case that he was aged 35 years and working as Generator Mechanic and Supervisor in S.P.R. Engineering for a salary of Rs. 4,000 per month and he is liable to be paid compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 by the respondents for the injuries sustained by him in the accident. It was his further case that he is a resident of Thanneer Pandal, Arulpuram Post, Tiruppur Circle and hence, the Tiruppur Sub-Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try it. In support of his case, the injured-claimant examined four witnesses and has marked 42 exhibits.
3. Contending contra, it was the case of the Transport Corporation that when the claimant attempted to overtake its bus, he lost his balance, fell down near the rear wheel of the bus and got injured and thus, the accident occurred only due to careless and negligent act of the claimant and not because of rash and negligent act of the bus driver as contended by the claimant. The Transport Corporation also contested the claim of the claimant with regard to his age, occupation and income and the medical expenses alleged to have been incurred by him and also the total compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 sought by him in the claim petition. To prove its case, the Transport Corporation failed to examine any witness nor did it mark any exhibit. It was its strong case that the claimant did not reside in the jurisdiction of either the sub-court or the Tribunal and as such, claim petition had to be dismissed on the ground that the Tribunal did not have the territorial jurisdiction to examine the case.
4. Mrs. Hema Sampath, learned Counsel for the appellant-claimant has contended that:
(a) there was no necessity to show documents to prove the place of residence;
(b) the Transport Corporation had not adduced any contra evidence to disprove the appellant's stand that he lived within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; and
(c) the Tribunal ought not to have dismissed the claim petition on technical grounds which is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy : AIR1996SC2627 .
5. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant.
6. The points arising for consideration in this appeal are as to whether the Tribunal had the territorial jurisdiction to decide the claim petition and if so, on account of whose negligence the accident occurred and what is the extent of compensation to be paid to the claimant, if at all he deserves to be paid.
7. The appellant-claimant, in his claim petition, has stated that he is a resident of Thanneer Pandal, Arulpuram Post, Tiruppur Circle and hence, the Tiruppur Sub-Court had the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Whereas the respondent, the Transport Corporation has rebutted the place of residence of claimant. At the time of chief-examination, the appellant-claimant has deposed that he is a resident of Door No. 116, Uppilipalayam Road, Arulpuram Post, Thanneer Pandal, Palladam Taluk and this is contrary to the statement made by him in the claim petition that his place of residence comes within the Tiruppur Revenue Circle. He has further deposed that he was staying with his brother at 6-D/l 1, Kavitha Lakshmi Nagar, Anupparpalayam Post, Tiruppur. But, to prove the place of his residence, he admits that he does not have any records. From Exh. P40, the certificate issued by the Tehsildar on 10.2.2003 which states that he has been a resident of Kavitha Lakshmi Nagar for the last three years, it need not be accepted that he was a resident of the said place at the time of the accident, i.e., during the year 1997. In other words, the appellant-claimant has proved only the place of his past residence and not the place of his residence at the time of accident.
8. The counsel for appellant-claimant, in support of her contention that the claim petition ought not to have been dismissed on technical grounds, has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Passi v. P. Sesh Reddy : AIR1996SC2627 , in which para 11 reads as under:
(11) Some of the aforesaid significant amendments introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, have been referred to above only to indicate that even Parliament is conscious that right to claim compensation by the claimants in connection with the motor vehicles accidents should not be defeated on technical grounds.
9. In the above case relied on by the counsel for the appellant-claimant, it is the conductor/cleaner who drove the vehicle without a licence and that technical plea has been rejected in order to give benefit to the victim. But, the facts of the case on hand are entirely different since appellant has approached a forum without jurisdiction for adjudication of his claim and that too, without letting in any evidence in support of his place of residence. Thus, I am of the firm view that the question of jurisdiction is not a technical ground, rather a mandatory ground and thus the judgment relied on by the counsel for the appellant-claimant does not have relevance to the facts of the case on hand.
10. In support of her contention with regard to territorial jurisdiction, the counsel for the appellant-claimant has also relied on a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Waheed Khan : 1998(1)ALD720 , wherein it is observed as under:
(12) In the present case, it is fairly conceded by Mr. Rao that no challenge is made absolutely to the merits of the award. It is neither a case that the compensation has been improperly determined or that the compensation was not due. The whole objection is based upon the technical objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, there is no case absolutely that there has been any failure of justice on the matter being entertained by learned Commissioner at Hyderabad. Further, the conduct of the appellant also disentitles him to raise any such objection. In the case where death occurred, he never appeared and the case was decided ex parte. Even in the injury case, though he contested, yet, he was satisfied only on raising the objection as regards maintainability but never raised the question of lack of territorial jurisdiction before the Commissioner. Appellant also could have gone before the appellate court or could have come before this court to challenge the continuance of the proceedings before the Commissioner. No such steps were taken and on the contrary, the Commissioner was allowed to proceed with the case in which the appellant not only participated but also cross-examined the witnesses, filed documents and declared the evidence closed.
11. In the above case, the accident had occurred in Maharashtra and the claim petition had been filed in Andhra Pradesh. It was contended that no application before the Commissioner of a different place than where the accident occurred could have been filed or entertained and objection was raised for the first time in the appeal about the territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has considered it as correct. But, in the instant case, even from the very stage of filing its counter, the Transport Corporation has been contending that the claim petition cannot be maintained on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the reliance made by learned Counsel for the appellant cannot have a direct application to the case on hand.
12. Further, on the same point of territorial jurisdiction, the counsel for the appellant-claimant has relied on a decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Adarwati v. Mohanlal and the relevant portion reads as under:
(10) It is obvious, therefore, that the legislature, in this case, has departed from the usual rule that the suit should ordinarily be filed where cause of action arose or part of cause of action arose, or at the place the defendants reside. For the first time, Section 166 of the Act has been amended by substituting Sub-section (2) to it as per Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (54 of 1994), in view of the objects and reasons therefor para 4 of which reads as follows:
4. The Law Commission in its 119th Report had recommended that every application for a claim be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, at the option of the claimant. The Bill also makes necessary provision to give effect to the said recommendation.xxx xxx xxxSection 166(2) of the Act may be reproduced as under:
166(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed.
Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.
It is very clear that an applicant can file an application within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal-(i) where the accident occurred; or (ii) before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on his business; or (iii) within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on his business. Now, the word 'or' separates the three clauses and clear grammatical construction would be that the applicant can choose either of the three for getting the option. The very fact that there are three options implies that claimant has been given a right to choose one of the three possible places for exercising his option in a given case. Where the claimant exercises the option given in second clause mentioned above, all that the Claims Tribunal is required to find out, if the claimant resides or carries on his business within its territorial jurisdiction. The residence of the claimants in this case is of consequence the legislature gave them benefit of the option given in the second clause by going out of the way.
13. From a reading of the above, it can be seen that as per Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant can approach the court in whose jurisdiction : (i) the accident has taken place or (ii) he resides or carries on his business or (iii) the defendant resides or carries on his business. In the instant case, the petitioner-appellant has not fulfilled any of the above three options by letting in any evidence, even this judgment relied on by the learned Counsel has no application to the facts of the case on hand and hence, it cannot be sustained.
14. The appellant, after the decision of the Tribunal on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, should have chosen to file the claim petition before the appropriate court with the territorial jurisdiction. Instead, he has challenged the order of the Tribunal contending that the claim petition ought not to have been dismissed on a technical ground. This contention of the appellant cannot be sustained as the question of territorial jurisdiction is more important in deciding the quantum of compensation and a claimant cannot be allowed to choose the court according to his whims and fancies as it would amount to 'forum shopping'.
15. Further, since appellant-claimant has failed to prove that his place of residence is within the jurisdiction of the sub-court and the Tribunal and has resorted to approach these two forums for the reasons best known to him and since this appeal is liable to be dismissed on that ground itself, I am of the considered view that no further adjudication is warranted as regards the aspects of negligence and the quantum of compensation. Thus, I hold that impugned judgment of the Tribunal is infirmed in no way and the same is upheld.
16. However, it is made clear that the appellant-claimant is at liberty to initiate the claim petition for compensation within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order before the appropriate forum in whose jurisdiction he resided on the date of accident and for the purpose of limitation, the period during which he approached the sub-court, Tribunal and this court need not be taken into account. This view is taken only to give him a chance to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act which could be otherwise deprived of and in the event of his choosing the right forum to claim compensation, his claim may be considered by the Tribunal by taking evidence and taking into account his actual place of residence on the day of accident, i.e., on 11.12.1997.
With the above observations, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.