Judgment:
H.K. Rathod, J.
1. Heard learned Advocate, Mr. D.G. Chauhan, appearing on behalf of petitioner Corporation in all the three matters.
2. This group of three petitions involve one legal question and, therefore, common order is passed by this Court.
3. The fact of SCA No. 8010 of 2006 are as under :
3.1 The service of respondent workman was terminated on 5th July,1989. Industrial dispute was referred for adjudication on 15th November,1989 and award was passed by Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference No. 1884 of 1990 on 24th January,2001 granting reinstatement as a daily wagers and benefit of GR dated 17th October,1988 with back wages of interim period. This award is published on 26th October,2001 which was received by petitioner on 6th November,2001. This award is challenged by petitioner in present petition after a period of about more than 4 years. The reason for delay in challenging the present petition is incorporated in Para.10 of the present petition, which is quoted as under :
The petitioner respectfully submits that the award was passed on 24.1.2001 and the same was published on 26.10.2001. It was received by the petitioner on 6.11.2001. Thereafter, it was sent to the Head Office for taking appropriate decision to prefer petition in the High Court. Due to administrative reasons, the Head Office took some time in taking decision in the matter. Thereafter, the papers were misplaced and it could not be handed over to the Learned Advocate of the High Court to file the petition. Thereafter, on 16.8.2004 the matter was referred to the Learned Advocate for his opinion. On 17.8.2004 the learned Advocate opined to file the petition. Thereafter, all the papers were handed to the Learned Advocate for filing the petition. The learned Advocate also took some time as some important papers were not available in the file. Finally on 9.1.2006, the present petition is filed. The petitioner respectfully submits that there is a bona fide delay on the part of the petitioner and there is sufficient cause to condone the delay in the interest of justice. The petitioner therefore prays to condone the delay.3.2 The fact of SCA No. 8011 of 2006 are as under :
The service of respondent workman was terminated on 15th July,1989. Industrial dispute was referred for adjudication and award was passed by Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference No. 1691 of 1992 on 21st November,2001 granting reinstatement with continuity of service. This award was published on 9th April,2001 which was received by petitioner on 5th September,2001. This award is challenged by petitioner in present petition. The delay caused in challenging the present award is explained in Para.10 of the present petition, which is quoted as under :
The petitioner respectfully submits that the award was passed on 21.11.2000 and the same was published on 9.4.2001. It was received by the petitioner on 5.9.2001. Thereafter, on 4.12.2001 the papers were sent to the learned Advocate for his opinion as to whether the petition can be filed before the High Court. On 3.1.2002, the learned Advocate opined that the petitioner should be filed. Again, on 25.2.2003, the petitioner instructed the learned Advocate to file the petition in the High Court but the petition could not be filed. Thereafter, on 11.11.2004, the Corporation engaged another lawyer and requested him to file petition in the High Court against the said award. The learned Advocate also took some time as some important papers were not available in the file. Finally on 9.1.2006, the present petition is filed. The petitioner respectfully submits that there is a bonafide delay on the petitioner of the petitioner and there is sufficient cause to condone the delay in the interest of justice. The petitioner, therefore, prays to condone the delay.3.3 The fact of SCA No. 8014 of 2006 are as under :
The service of respondent workman was terminated on 31st May,1992. Industrial dispute was referred for adjudication on 6th November,1992 and award was passed by Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference No. 2406 of 1992 on 30th April,2001 granting reinstatement with full back wages of interim period. This award is published on 4th October,2001 which was received by petitioner in the month of November,2001. This award is challenged by petitioner in present petition. The delay caused in challenging the present award is explained in Para.10 of the present petition, which is quoted as under : It is submitted that the award was passed on 30.4.2001 and the same was published on 4.10.2001 and the same was received by the Corporation in the month of November,2001. Thereafter, it was sent to the Head Office, Gandhinagar for necessary action in the matter. Immediately by letter dated 5.11.2001, the concerned Officer sent all the papers to the learned Advocate of the Corporation to file petition in High Court against the award passed by the Labour Court. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-H is a copy of the letter dated 5.11.2001. Thereafter, number of reminders were sent to the learned Advocate to file petition, but it appears that through oversight, the petition could not be filed. Finally on 25.5.2004, the papers were taken from the learned Advocate and handed over to another Advocate with a request to file petition. The same documents were missing and, therefore, the petition could not be filed. Finally, the learned Advocate took some time in preparing the petition and there is delay in filing the present petition. The petitioner respectfully submit that there is sufficient cause in not filing the present petition within reasonable time. There is bonafide delay and, therefore, in the interest of justice, the delay may be condoned.
4. Learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan, submitted that there is no provision in the I.D.Act,1947, wherein, Limitation Act is applicable. He also submitted that there is no provision in Limitation Act which require a specific period to challenge the award before this Court. He also submitted that there is no provision in the Constitution which requires to file petition challenging the order or award by subordinate Court within some specific period. So, there is no limitation is applicable in filing the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, present petitions filed by petitioner challenging the award in question. He also submitted that the delay caused in filing the petitions is a bona fide delay on the part of the petitioner and same may be condoned in the interest of justice. He also submitted that the award, in fact, is nullity and Labour Court has no jurisdiction to pass such award and, therefore, it can be challenged at any time. For that, there is no limitation or any restriction to challenge such award within some prescribed period. In support of his submission, he relied upon two decisions of Apex Court. The first decision which has been relied upon by learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan, is in case of Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma reported in : AIR1996SC2750 . He relied upon Para.2 of the said decision and pointed out that approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. He also emphasized that it is very difficult to explain day to day delay because of the business transaction of the corporation. Learned Advocate, Mr.Chauhan, has read over Para.2 of the said decision before this Court, which is quoted as under :
2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day to day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice, it would result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge had rightly adopted correct approach and has condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every days delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.
5. Another decision relied by learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan, is in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in : 2008(228)ELT162(SC) . Learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan, relied upon Para.5, 9 and 11 of the said decision. All the three paragraphs have been read over by him before this Court to emphasis that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of legal injury so suffered. Accordingly, his submission is that the delay is bona fide and same may be condoned. Except this, no other submission is made by learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan and no other decision is relied by him.
6. The law on the question raised in the present petitions, has been examined by the Apex Court as well as various High Courts. That has been discussed as under :
6.1 In case of Bishnu Charan Mohantry v. State of Orrisa reported in AIR 1973 Orissa 1999, the following general principles relating to delay and laches has been laid down:
(i) The Limitation Act has no application to writ petitions. Where, however, a suit for identical relief would be barred by the law of limitation, the court would ordinarily refuse to exercise discretion to grant relief under Article 226.
(ii) Even if a suit for the same relief is not barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, yet the High Court may refuse to issue a writ, if otherwise the delay is not explainable by satisfactory reasons.
(iii) Two important circumstances to be borne in mind in all such cases are : the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other so far as relates to the remedy.
(iv) Where by the conduct of the party, the delay might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of the remedy, the relief under Article 226 would be refused.
(v) Even if the conduct or act is not equivalent to a waiver, if the neglect of the petitioner put to opposite party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy is afterwards granted, the relief under Article 226 should be refused on account of delay and laches.
(vi) Utmost expedition is the essence for a claim under Article 226; and
(vii) no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case is to be determined on its own facts and circumstances.
6.2 The further view has laid down by the Supreme Court in case of P.S. adasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in : [1975]2SCR356 . Relevant observations of the said decision is quoted as under :
It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.6.3 In the case of Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in 2000 III LLJ 3, the Calcutta High has held in Para, 6, 7 and 8 as under :
6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the impugned judgment and order as apart from the fact that the learned trial Judge has refused to exercise its power of judicial review it had also recorded a finding as regards the question of delay in the following terms :
Before parting with this case it should be noted that though the learned Tribunal passed the award as far back as March 28, 1984 th writ application was not filed before February 8, 1990 on the plea that delay was due to the fact that Government permission could not be obtained before February 7, 1989. The explanation is not satisfactory. The plea of delay on the ground of office formalities is absolutely untenable especially in case of Industrial Disputes where there was illegal termination of service about 20 years ago. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent union that this long delay on the part of the management of all the workmen not only the wasting of their valuable years of lives but have also caused death to some of them. It is true, that there is no limitation in filing the writ application but that shall not automatically entitle the petitioner to make limitless delay in filing the writ application, especially, in case of the present nature, where such delay brought untold miseries to the workmen. There being unreasonable delay in filing the application on frivolous ground the writ Court would have refused to grant any relief to the petitioner, even if it had been otherwise entitled to it. Th writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay also.7. Mr. Ginwala submits that delay cannot be considered to be a ground for refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by the High Court in a case where the writ of prohibition is to be issued. The submission of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. The appellant primarily has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the aforementioned award dated March 28, 1994 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Prayer for issuance of a writ of prohibition had been sought for and the same could be issued only in the event the primary prayer of the appellant viz. A writ of certiorari would be issued. It is now a well settled principle of law that the delay defeats equity. It is further well settled that a person who sleeps over its right cannot claim any equity in enforcing its right before a writ Court.
8. Writ of certiorari as is well known is a discretionary remedy. A writ Court does not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because it is lawful to do so. While exercising its Jurisdiction under Article 226 a writ Court may take into account several factors, delay being one of them. As noticed by the learned trial Judge the concerned workmen were refused employment as far back as in the year 1975 and reference was made by the Central Government only on August 1, 1978. The learned Tribunal below made its awards on March 28, 1984. The writ application had been filed only on February 8, 1990. The only explanation which the appellant gave before the learned Trial Judg was that it was required to obtain permission of the Central Government for filing a writ application which could not be obtained before February 7, 1989. the said explanation, having been offered without any particulars, did not find favour with the learned trial Judge. He, therefore, refused to exercise its discretion.
6.4 In case of M.C.D. v. Rajkumar and Ors. reported in 2004 Lab IC 2334, the Delhi High Court has held in Para 3 and 4 as under :
3. This writ petition challenges the Award dated 10th July,2000. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the award was published on 4th January,2001 and the information relating thereto was received in the office of the petitioner Corporation on 14th February,2001. However, the writ petition was filed in this Court only on 18th February,2002. There is no other explanation for the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. Mr. Monga has submitted that in matters relating to the movement of files in Government Department, files move at their own pace and such delay in the movement of the official files occur because they are required to go through several channels. Consequently the delay in filing the writ petition is not such which should dis-entitle the petitioner to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. In my view, institutionalized lethargy cannot be any ground to explain the laches of more than one year. Merely because the bureaucratic machinery in MCD moves slowly cannot be a ground for condoning laches.
6.5 In case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India reported in : (1993)ILLJ260SC , the Apex Court has held in Para.8 as under :
8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Art. 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not .be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned Counsel for the petitioner. We are further of the view that these circumstances also justify refusal of the relief claimed under Art. 136 of the Constitution.6.6 In case of State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors. reported in : [1987]1SCR1 , the Apex Court has held in Para.23 as under :
23. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, : (1979)IILLJ217SC and the other in Ashok Kumar v. Collector, Raipur, : [1980]1SCR491 . We may point out that in R. D. Shetty's case (supra), even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs. 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.6.7 In case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. Jai Bhagwan reported in 2003-I LLJ 1029, the Delhi High Court has held in Para.4 and 5 as under:
4. My attention has been drawn by Ms.Bajaj to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal : [1964]6SCR261 . The Apex Court observed that :
It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay, the Court ought not to ordinarily lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.... It appears to us, however, that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable, even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable.
It will be relevant to bear in mind that the Constitution Bench was concerned with a situation where the petitioner has voiced the grievance that he had been assessed to tax under a void statute. Even in those extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court has declined to over look the laches. Ms. Kittoo Bajaj also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharasthra Road State Corporation v. Balvant Regular Motor Service Amravati : [1969]1SCR808 . In that case, the Apex Court again articulated that;
It is well established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party.
The Court relied on Lindsey Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Arbran Farewell and John Kemp (1874) 5 PC 221 and also specifically noticed in its earlier decision in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Neher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450 : 1967 -II LLJ 34, Ms. Kittoo Bajaj relies on the observations of the Apex Court in Naik Subedar Lachhman Dass v. Union of India : 1977CriLJ1574 , there the Court found that the writ petition has been filed after gross delay for which there was no specific explanation and, therefore, endorsed the High Court's decision for a summary dismissal of the action. It may be observed that the laches have not even been attempted to be answered or explained by the DTC.
5. On the issue of delay and laches, Mr. Vibhu Shankar, learned Consel for the petitioners, has relied heavily on Para.6 of the judgment in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay (Supra) which reads as under at p.38 of 1967-II LLJ 34.
On behalf of the respondents Mr. B. Sen, however, pointed out that the conduct of the appellant does not entitle it to the grant of a writ, because it has been guilty of acquiescence or delay. It was pointed out that the award of Mr. Bhat was given on April 25, 1958 but an application to the High Court for grant of a writ was made long after on November 16, 1959. We do not think there is any substance in this argument, because the second respondents had made an application, dated August 19, 1958 to the Labour Court for enforcement of the award and the appellant had contested that application by a Written Statement, dated September 15, 1958. The Labour Court allowed the application on August 4, 1959 and the appellant had preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court on August 31, 1959. The decision of the Industrial Court was given on October 24, 1959 and after the appeal was dismissed the appellant moved the High Court for grant of a writ on November 16, 1959. Mr. B. Sen then put forward the argument that the appellant itself had acted on the bonus agreement and on October 14, 1957 had issued a notice informing its workers that 'pursuant to the award of the Industrial Court in terms of the agreement, dated March l, 1956 reached between the Millowners' Association, Bombay, and the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, regarding payment of bonus would be paid to them at 4.8 per cent of the total basic earning during 1956'. On October 27, 1956 the appellant and the Secretary of the second respondents signed a joint statement in which it was stated as follows :
Since it has not yet been possible to complete bonus calculations for all these years, it is hereby agreed between the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Bombay, and the Moon Mills Ltd, Bombay, that under the Bonus Agreement the Moon Mills should pay a bonus at the rate of 4.8 per cent for each of the years 1953, 1954 and 1955 as a tentative payment.It was, therefore, contended that the appellant itself had agreed with the second respondents to pay bonus for 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 according to the terms of the bonus agreement. It was also pointed out that the appellant had not pressed its objection with regard to jurisdiction before the Labour Court or the Industrial Court. But it appears that the decision of this Court in Prakash Cotton Mills case, : (1962)ILLJ108SC , was given on February 16, 1961 after the decision of K. K. Desai, J. on July 1, 1960 and before the decision of the Letters Patent Bench on February 6, 1962. In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to a grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ of certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though not identical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239, as follows:-
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as related to the remedy.
In the present case, we are of opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant as may disentitle it to the grant of a writ.
7. I have considered the submissions made by learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan. I have also considered the law on the subject as decided by the Apex Court and various High Courts as referred above. In these petitions, it is not necessary to see that how much delay has been caused in filing the present petitions. But it is necessary to see that how much damage has been caused by a corporate body to the poor workmen. Merely having reasonable ground being a corporate body, delay of more than 4 and 1/2 years' period cannot be condoned in light of the factual aspect that workmen those who were terminated in the year 1989 and 1992. It is necessary to note that Corporation was party before the Labour Court was appeared and contested the reference. The Labour Court has taken time to decide the matters about more than 10 years. That after a period of 10 years, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with some back wages and with some benefits. The petitioner was knowing fully well that they are appearing before the Labour Court; the award has been published and copy of which has been received by the Corporation in the year 2001, in spite of that fact, there is a delay in challenging such award for more than 4 and 1/2 years. What action has been taken by the Corporation about implementation of the award in question, there is no whisper made by the Corporation in Para.10. What happened to the workmen and their family, who remained without job for more than 15 years. A right of reinstatement with back wages and with benefits is a right to life. Such fundamental right has been denied by the Corporation without any justification in spite of having the knowledge that the award was received by the Corporation in the year 2001. In view of this hard reality that workmen are out of job since 1989 / 1992 and till date, they are not able to get even a reinstatement in service. When right has been disturbed or to some extent curtailed, then, the Corporation being corporate body immediately approaches the Court and requests the Court to condone such lapse on their part. But what happened to the right of the workmen who are remained out of job for more than 15 years, though award was passed in their favour remained intact for more than 4 and 1/2 years. So worry of the Corporation about their right to condone the delay of challenging such award after a period of 4 and 1/2 years cannot be condoned. The interest of justice will apply not only to the party who has approached the Court, but to the other side also.
8. In this factual background and considering the conduct of the Corporation that no care has been taken by the Corporation after receiving the award in the year 2001, no order of reinstatement has been issued in favour of workman. In such a situation, it is a duty of the corporate body to see that some part of the award must have to be implemented in favour of the workmen subject to the result or out come of present proceedings. But, they were under the impression that decision which has been taken by the Corporation to challenge the award give them a licence or permission to file the present proceedings without implementing the award in question. Not to implement the award amounts to an offence under Section 29 of the I.D.Act,1947.So the petitioner who has committed offence in not implementing the award in question continuously for more than 4 and 1/2 years, requests this Court to condone the delay in the interest of justice because according to them it was bona fide delay. It is not a bona fide delay, but there is a mala fide conduct on the part of petitioner not to implement the award in question. It may be the malice in law, but there is a malice on the part of petitioner not to implement the award in question since they knew from the very beginning that they are challenging the award in question before the higher forum even without implementing the same.
9. The submission of Mr.Chauhan is that Limitation Act is not applicable. There is no provision in the Constitution which requires to filing of petition within some specified period. For that, there is no dispute. But, a reasonable period must have to be considered for filing proceedings against the award passed by the Labour Court. This period of more than 4 and 1/2 years cannot be considered to be a reasonable period. This is totally unreasonable period which Corporation wants this Court to condone in the interest of justice. Looking to the Para.10 of each petition, where averments have been made by the petitioner that after receiving the award, it was sent to the Head Office for taking appropriate decision to prefer petition in the High Court. Due to administrative reasons, the Head Office took some time in taking decision in the matter. There is no detail given as to what was the administrative reasons that prevented the petitioner from taking the decision for a period of more than 3 years during which matter remained pending before the Head Office. The award was published in the year 2001 and decision to file petitions has been taken in the year 2004. When the papers were immediately send to the Head Office for appropriate decision, whether such explanation that due to administrative reasons, they could not take the decision to file present proceedings for a period of three years cannot be said to be reasonable. The submission of Mr.Chauhan is that this 3 years' period has elapsed merely on administrative reasons, but no details have been given by the petitioner explaining the aforesaid period and the matter remained with the head office for a period of three years and why the decision has not been taken immediately or within reasonable time by the Head Office. Who is responsible for it Whether any action against responsible officer has been taken by the Corporation, no details have been given. So, for a period of three years, no explanation is given by the petitioner why delay has been occurred except administrative reasons which is totally irrelevant because administrative reasons being vague cannot be considered to be more than 3 years' period. The petitioner has not disclosed as to what are the administrative reasons that prevented them from taking decision. Thereafter, another lapse of more than 2 years occurred at the end of the concerned Advocate after receiving the papers on 17th August,2004. There is no explanation with regard to the delay from 17th August,2004 till the date of filing the present petition why delay is occurred. If there is a delay on the part of Advocate concerned after receiving the papers, then, affidavit of concerned Advocate should have to be filed in support of such reasons. But no affidavit of Advocate is filed on record by the petitioner. Therefore, total period of more than 4 years remained unexplained and, therefore, considering the details given in Para.10 of each petition in absence of details of more than 4 years period, why the matter has remained with head office and why it remained pending with the Advocate. Therefore, considering this factual aspect that there is no detailed explanation except vague statement of administrative reasons and Advocate took some time to prepare the petition. Except that, there is no reason has been given by the petitioner for condoning the delay of more than 4 and 1/2 years.
10. Two decisions which have been relied upon as referred above by learned Advocate are not applicable to the facts of this case, because in the decision reported in : AIR1996SC2750 , a general observations have been made by the Apex Court. There is no detail in the decision as to how much delay was ultimately condoned by the Apex Court. However, one observation of the Apex Court in the said decision is relevant which is quoted as under : Sit would result in it must have been by skillful management on delay in the process of filing the appeal. In this case, it is really a skillful management efforts deliberately the delay in filing the present petition. In second decision is also not helpful to the petitioner. Para.5 which has been relied on, there is no ratio laid down by Apex Court. It is only a factual averments made by Apex Court. In Par.9, the observation made by the Apex Court which gives the power to the Court to exercise discretionary power Sif the delay is within certain limit. This observation is applicable to the facts of this case. Can we say that a delay of more than 4 and 1/2 unexplained be within certain limit It cannot be so in light of the factual aspect as discussed by this Court as referred above. In Para.9 except general observation in respect to the law of limitation, there is no specific ratio has been decided by the Apex court. In respect to Para.11, one important observation is relevant to the fact of this case which is quoted as under : Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics to seek their remedy promptly. SThe idea is that every legal remedy must have kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time. Meaning thereby that some reasonable period if satisfactorily explained being a sufficient cause, then, the Court may exercise the discretionary powers judicially to condone the delay. But the facts of this case are totally reverse.
11. The petitioner being a corporate body having number of persons working on legal side. they must have appointed legal officers or some legal assistance for the defence in various cases or to file certain case against the respective parties. It is not a case of poor workman or a villagers who approach the Court with a request that delay can be condoned because he was not able to understand the consequences or he was not having sufficient means to challenge the action within some reasonable time. So any handicap upon the party pointed out to the satisfaction of the Court not to file proceedings within reasonable time, then, Court may certainly exercise the discretionary powers, but in this case, Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation Ltd. the petitioner is having highest officer working in the Corporation upto IAS level and still matter remained pending with the head office for more than 3 years and matter remained pending with the Advocate for a period of 2 years. For that, there is no explanation or any other details have been given by the petitioner nor any affidavit from responsible officer of the head office and Advocate concerned is filed. There is clear positive negligence and carelessness of petitioner. No documents and correspondence of head office and Advocate concerned produced on record. Therefore, according to my opinion, the delay in filing the present petition is not satisfactorily explained by the petitioner. There is no justifiable and sufficient cause shown by the petitioner to get the delay condoned. The contention of Mr. Chauhan that Labour Court has passed an award without jurisdiction and award is nullity. Whatever the defect according to petitioner in the award that is required to be examined by the competent Court. Unless and until competent Court examined the award in question, merely having the opinion about the award of the petitioner has no consequence.
12. In view of the above observations, considering all the submissions made by learned Advocate, Mr. Chauhan, comprehensively, considering the two decisions relied by Mr. Chauhan, according to my opinion, petitioner is not able to satisfy the conscience of the Court about condoning the delay and there is no sufficient cause shown to this Court which can condone the delay as prayed for by petitioner. Therefore, in absence of satisfactory explanation and sufficient cause, delay in filing the present petitions is not condoned and all the three petitions are rejected only on the ground of delay without considering the merits of the matters. This Court has not expressed any opinion about the merits of the matters.