Judgment:
Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. This matter comes up before us by reference made by the Division Bench consisting of D. H. Shukla and one of us A. P. Ravani, JJ. According to the learned Judges, who referred the matter, the definition of 'dangerous person' contained in S. 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 requires consideration by a larger Bench since the learned Judges, who referred the matter, thought that the pronouncement of Division Benches of our High Court regarding the definition of 'dangerous person' occurring in the Act requires reconsideration. Though it is not necessary for us to go into the facts of the case, which are the subject-matter of Special Criminal Application No. 225 of 1986, for the completion of the record, we may state a few facts :
2. The Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City, Vadodara passed a detention order on 28th Oct., 1985 detaining the petitioner by name Ashok Ambu Parmar under the provisions of the Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the detention order on various grounds. In this case the petitioner is detained on the ground that he is a 'dangerous person' as defined under S. 2(c) of the Act. It is the say of the petitioner that as per the definition of 'dangerous person' occurring in S. 2(c) of the Act, a person, either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang should have, during a period of three Successive years habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chap. XVI or Chap. XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chap. V of the Arms Act, 1959. Interpreting this definition, the petitioner submitted that there must have been commission of offences as contemplated in S. 2(c) on every successive year prior to the passing of the detention order. It is submitted by the petitioner that if there is no offence committed in any one of these successive years, a person cannot be termed as a 'dangerous person' and as such, the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 cannot be invoked. In support of his contention, the petitioner cited the Division Bench judgments rendered in (1) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 656 of 1985, (Ayubkhan v. State of Gujarat) , reported in 1986 (27) 1 Guj LR 543: (1987 Cri LJ 1)' (2) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 873 of 1985 decided on Jan. 10, 1986, by B. K. Mehta and B. S. Kapadia, JJ., (3) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 1077 of 1985: (reported in 1987 Cri LJ 2) decided on Feb. 5, 1986 by B. K. Mehta and B. S. Kapadia, JJ., (4) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 1094 of 1985 decided on Feb. 21, 1986 by G. T. Nanavati and R. J. Shah, JJ., (5) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 1189 of 1985 decided on Mar. 17, 1986 by G. T. Nanavati and R. 1 Shah, JJ., (6) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 41 of 1986 decided on 18-3-1986 by G. T. Nanavati and R. J. Shah, JJ,, and (7) Spl. Criminal Appln. No. 1036 of 1985 decided on Mar. 23, 1986 by G. T. Nanavati and R. J. Shah, JJ. All these Division Benches are of the uniform opinion that to come under the mischief of definition of Dangerous person' occurring in S. 2(c) a person, either by himself or as member or 1eader of a gang during a period of three successive years should have habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chap. XVI or Chap. XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chap. V of the Arms Act, 1959. In short, the learned Judges held in these decisions that the offences should have been committed in all the three years preceding the date of detention order. Hence, it is clear from these judgments that if there is no commission of any of the offences mentioned in S. 2(c) for any one of the three years prior to the order of detention, the person cannot be termed as 'dangerous person' and as such, no order of detention can be passed against him. The Division Bench consisting of D. H. Shukla and A. P. Ravani, JJ., in Special Criminal Application No. 225 of 1985 felt difficulty in accepting this interpretation of the definition 'dangerous person' occurring in S. 2(c) and as such, the matter has been placed before this larger Bench to reconsider the interpretation given by the above said Division Benches.
3. Mr. Bharat C. Dave, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, read the above referred Bench decisions and contended that the interpretation given by the Benches referred above are correct and they have to be upheld. Mr. J. C. Shah, intervening in this case, supported the above said Bench decision and contended that even though the period mentioned in S. 2(c) has to be taken as one unit of time, the reference to every three successive years makes it clear that the offence ought to have been committed in every year. Reading the Ordinance which preceded the Act, Mr. Shah contended that the sentence 'during a period of three successive years' is not in the Ordinance and that these words have been inserted only in the Act in order to stress that a person, to come under the mischief of S. 2(c) should have committed offences every year mentioned in this section. Mr. Shah also read the word 'during' occurring in this definition section and submitted that there ought to have been commission of offence during the period of every year mentioned in the section. We shall refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Shah in the course of our discussion in this judgment.
4. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State submitted that the word 'during' occurring in S. 2(c) will not indicate that the offence should have been committed throughout the period. According to the learned Advocate General, the period given in the definition section has to be taken as one unit of time and if that be so, the words 'a person' occurring in this section will only indicate that during that period the offence mentioned in this definition should have been committed. Reading such of those definitions where the words 'habitually commits' occur, the learned Advocate General submitted that the intention of the Legislature is that there must have been commission of offence in the said unit of time which is fixed as three years' period in this Act. In support of his contention the learned Advocate General read the Objects and Reasons for bringing out the Ordinance, the preamble of the Act and also the method of interpreting statutory provisions as enunciated by Francis Bennion in his book entitled 'Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation'. We will consider these relevant materials during our discussion hereunder.
5. The Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 was preceded by an Ordinance called 'The Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Ordinance'. This was promulgated by the State of Gujarat on 27th May, 1985. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for promulgating the Ordinance is as follows:
' It is noticed by the State Government that the activities of certain anti-social persons who in common parlance are known in the society as boot-legers, drug offenders, goondas (dangerous persons), immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers cause feeling of insecurity among the general public as also grave and widespread danger to the life and property of the public and thereby affect the maintenance of public order in the State. With a view to maintaining the public order in the State, it is considered necessary to enact a special legislation for the detention of such anti-social persons'.
Subsequently the Act came to be enacted called 'The Gujarat Act No. 16 of 1985'. It was published in the Gujarat Government Gazette, after receiving the assent of the Governor, on 2nd Aug., 1985. The preamble of this Act states :
'An Act to provide for preventive detention of boot-leggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for preventing their antisocial and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.'
Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the Act is to curb the anti-social activities of certain types of individuals only. One such individual is the person who comes under the definition of 'dangerous person'. The others are bootleggers, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers. In this case, we are concerned with the definition of 'dangerous person' which occurs in S. 2(c).
6. In the Ordinance the definition of the 'dangerous person' was given as follows:
'2(c) 'dangerous person' means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chap. XVII or Chap. XXII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chap. V of the Arms Act, 1959.'
This definition given in the Ordinance was inserted in the Act with certain modifications. Section 2(c) of the Act No. 16 of 1985 reads as follows :
'2. In this Act; unless the context otherwise requires, -
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(c) 'dangerous person' means a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three successive years habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abet the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chap. XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chap. V of the Arms Act, 1959.'
Thus, we are able to see that there is an addition of a phrase in the Act which runs as follows :
'during a period of three successive years'.
Reading the Statement of Objects and Reasons for promulgating the Ordinance and also the preamble to this Act, it is clear that the Legislature wanted to identify an individual who can be said to be a 'dangerous person' rather than defining the time factor within which the dangerous activities should be carried on. If we read the various definitions occurring in this Act for 'bootleggers' in S. 2(b), for 'drug-offender' in S. 2(f), for 'immoral traffic offender' in S. 2(g) and for 'property grabber' in S. 2(h), it is clear the time factor is not there. The Legislature, in order to identify a 'dangerous person' who habitually commits such offences thought it fit to prescribe a period as a unit of time. That is why we find in this definition S. 2(c) the phrase 'a period of three successive years' instead of 'the period of three successive years'. Further, there is nothing in this phrase 'a period of three successive years' to denote 'a period of each successive year'. Underline is given by us in order to emphasise the words used. Deliberately, the legislature has used 'a' and has also omitted to use 'each' in the phrase 'a period of three successive years'. This also clearly brings out the intention of the legislature in treating this period as one unit of time and it will be too much for us to interpret by stating that the offence ought to have been committed in each of such three years.
7. Coming to the meaning of the word 'during' from the Dictionary, we are able to see the following meanings:
'(1) Throughout the continuance of;
(2) At some point in the duration of.'
(The Concise Oxford Dictionary)
Considering the fact that the object of the legislature is to identify the 'dangerous person' who habitually commits the offences mentioned in S. 2(c), the meaning 'at some point in the duration of' fits in more than the meaning 'throughout the continuance of'. The time factor mentioned in this definition is only the unit of time as a whole and during that unit of time if the offences have been committed at some point of time habitually, the mischief of S. 2(c) will be attracted. If we give any other meaning to the words 'during a period of' occurring in this section than the one we have stated above, then the section will become unworkable and will lead to a lot of anomalies. It is too much to expect that the offence should have been committed in every year mentioned in this section to attract the mischief of the definition of 'dangerous person'. If that interpretation is given, logically, it can also be stretched by saying that the offence should be committed every day, if not every minute of the period of three successive years. To avoid such absurd interpretation, the one we have referred above, which is in consonance with the objects and reasons for promulgating the Act by the legislature is possible. Further, the introduction of the phrase 'during period of three successive years' in S. 2(c) of the Act can be explained by stating that this phrase is introduced with view to restrict the detaining authority from taking a longer period into account and at the same time making it clear to all concerned that it will be open to the detaining authority to take into account the activities of the person during the entire span of three successive years. This was necessary for the legislature because there are decisions in which even instances prior to one year of the order of detention have been held to be stale by the Courts.
8. The word 'successive' occurring in S. 2(c), in our opinion, goes with the unit of time and not with the commission of crime. The phrase 'three successive years' is used only with a view to point out the time limit which is to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority. The meanings given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary for the word 'successive' are as follows :
'Following one after another, in uninterrupted succession, running, consecutive.'
This word 'successive', as we have observed, goes with the unit of time and not with the commission of crime and if that be so, it cannot be interpreted that to come under the definition of 'dangerous person' a person should have committed the offences mentioned in the definition in each year. If this phrase 'three successive years' is not taken as indicating the unit of time, absurd results will follow by allowing a dangerous person to get out of the purview of this Act solely on the ground that in some of such successive years, that person has not committed the offence mentioned in the definition S. 2(c). The Court should not apply the literal meaning to the words regardless of the consequences. It is a cardinal principle that if the words are capable of more than one meaning, the Court must accept that meaning which will be in consonance with the spirit and purpose for which such an enactment has been made. In the book cited by the learned Advocate General entitled 'Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation' it has been succinctly observed as follows :
'In interpreting an Act of Parliament, is not, in general, a true line of construction to decide according to the strict letter of the Act; but the Courts will rather consider what is its fair meaning, and will expound it differently from the letter, in order to preserve the intent.'
'There are many so-called rules of construction that Courts of law have resorted to in their interpretation of statutes but the paramount rule remains that every statute is to be expounded according to its manifest and expressed intention.'
'It is the basic principle of legal policy that law should serve the public interest. The Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of (he instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, should presume that the legislator intended to observe this principle. It should therefore, strive to avoid adopting a construction which is in anyway adverse to the public interest.'
We are in complete agreement with the above said principles.
9. In giving the words their ordinary meaning if we are faced with extraordinary results which cannot have been intended by the legislature, we then have to move on to the second stage in which we re-examine the words. In case we are faced with two possible constructions of legislative language, we have to look to the results of adopting each of the alternatives respectively for the purpose of upholding the true intention of the legislature. The construction which promotes the objective for which the enactment is intended must be adopted. Our interpretation must be in keeping with the purpose for which the legislation was promulgated. In the above said light, if we examine the purpose for which Gujarat Act No. 16 of 1985 is promulgated, it will be clear that it is promulgated for the purpose of spotting out dangerous persons apart from other category of persons who have to be taken into custody in order to prevent their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If that be so, the phrase 'a period of three successive years' mentioned in S. 2(c) spells out the unit of time for the purpose of spotting out the dangerous person. Hence, to interpret this section literally by stating that only such of those persons who have committed the offences mentioned in this section in each of these three years can be construed as 'dangerous persons', will go against the spirit and purpose for which this enactment has been made. This view is fortified by the decision cited by Mr. J. G. Shah himself. In one of the decisions cited by the learned counsel, which is Bhaiya Lal Sharma v. Sales Tax Officer, Hardoi, reported in (1970) 26 STC 458, the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider the words 'during the course of an assessment year' in S. 18(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Bench of the Allahabad High Court held :
'During the course of an assessment year' in S. 18(2) would mean the whole of that year. Therefore if a business is commenced at any point of time in that year, it will be covered by the sub-section. A business commenced from 1st April will not be outside the purview of the sub-section.'
In yet another decision in the case of State v. Kanhiyalal Jain reported in 32 STC 21 :(1974 Tax LR 1601) a Bench of the High Court of Orissa had occasion to consider the expression 'period' in S. 12(8) in the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The Orissa High Court observed in that case :
'The expression 'period' in S. 12(8) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, cannot be construed as restricted to a quarter nor can it be said to relate to the whole year for which accounts are maintained by the assessee. In common parlance, the meaning of the word 'period' would be a duration of time.'
The learned Advocate General also cited the decision of the High Court of Australia in the case of Juanita Gough v. Errol Hunter Gough reported in 95 CLR 369 wherein the High Court- had occasion to consider S. 16(f) of Matrimonial Causes Act, 1899-1954. In that case the High Court of Australia had occasion to consider as to when a wife can present a petition to dissolve the marriage. The provision that was considered in that case was that the wife with three years' domicile in New South Wales could present a petition praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that during one year previously her husband has repeatedly assaulted and cruelly beaten the petitioner. The High Court observed that the word during' occurring in that section suggests that a time limit is prescribed within which the act of cruelty ought to have been committed. It further observed that the primary purpose for introducing the word must have been to put a limit of time to the period within which the facts must occur that constitute the ground of divorce. The High Court was of the opinion that such act of cruelty need not be continuous. Referring to the word 'repeatedly' occurring in that section, the High Court observed that such a word has been introduced due to the association of the idea suggested by the word 'repeatedly'. Proceeding further, the High Court of Australia observed :
'The change of language from 'within' to 'during that period' there looks to be rather instinctive than designed or deliberate. Probably it was due to the association of the idea suggested by the word 'repeatedly'. If the words had been 'in the course of that period' the meaning would have been conveyed. The better mode of interpreting and applying S. 16(f) seems to be to understand it as limiting the period within which you must find acts satisfying the description to twelve months and as requiring that there shall be it series of such acts forming separate incidents or examples of conduct on the husband's part; Such a series itself implies that the acts are spread in point of time. But it is difficult to suppose that they must be spread over the whole twelve months. It would mean that at neither end of the period nor anywhere within it could there be a substantial interval in which the petitioner enjoyed a suspension of the cruel beatings or succeeded in avoiding them.'
This decision also clearly supports the interpretation which we are placing on the phrase 'during a period of three successive years'. The learned Advocate General also brought to our notice the Ordinance issued by the Governor of Gujarat on 24th July, 1986. In and by the said Ordinance, the phrase 'during a period of three successive years' has been deleted from the main S, 2(c). The Statement of Objects and Reasons for deleting this phrase reads as follows :
'According to the existing definition of 'dangerous person' in Clause (c) of S. 2 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, a person would fall within the definition only if he habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of the offences mentioned therein during a period of three successive years. However, in the case where persons habitually commit offences mentioned in the said Clause (c) but, the requirement that offences should pertain to a period of three successive years is not fulfilled they cannot be detained under the said Act. It is, therefore, considered necessary to do away with that requirement by deleting the words 'during a period of three successive years' appearing in the said Clause (c).'
The decision referred in paragraph supra rendered by various Division Benches of our High Court have literally interpreted the phrase 'during a period of three successive years' and have held that in each of the said three years, the offence should have been committed to come under the mischief of 'dangerous person' as defined in S. 2(c). This has necessitated the Government to issue the Ordinance deleting those words since its intention is to detain the 'dangerous persons' who have committed such offences within the unit of time prescribed in that section. If our interpretation given in this decision were to be there, there would not have been any necessity to spell out the intention of the Government by the Ordinance referred above. Whatever it may be, the intention of the legislature is clear to the effect that they were particular in detaining the dangerous persons who have committed such offences defined in S. 2(c) within the said unit of time mentioned therein. This intention, according to our interpretation made in this judgment, can even be spelt out from the phrase 'during a period of three successive years' occurring in S. 2(c) as it originally stood.
10. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the correct interpretation that has to be placed for the phrase 'during a period of three successive years' occurring in S. 2(c) of Act No. 16 of 1985 is that it refers only to the unit of time and will take in such of those persons as 'dangerous persons' who have habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chap. XVI or Chap. XV I of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chap. V of the Arms Act, 1959 at any time during the said period of three years before the passing of the detention order. It is not necessary that the offences should have been committed in each of these years as wrongly construed by the various Division Benches of our High Court in the above cited decisions. The reference is answered in the above said terms. The special criminal application will now be placed before the Division Bench for disposal in the light of our interpretation of S. 2(c) of the Act No. 16 of 1985.
11. Order accordingly.