Judgment:
S.B. Wad, J.
1. This Revision is directed against the order of the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, refusing temporary injunction to the petitioners. The petitioners have filed the suit claiming to be the tenants of the open plot No. 11-12, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi and have asked for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from dis-possessing the petitioners from the suit property. The trial court had granted temporary injunction in favor of the petitioners. That order was reversed by the impugned order.
2. The property consisting of two plots measuring about 1000 sq. yards is adventage point on the Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar. The respondent claims that the present value of the property is about Rs. 40 lacs. Considering the location of the property, its measurement and the sky recketing prices of land in Delhi it does not appear to be an exaggerated claim. The property belongs to the respondent and his brother and a partition suit is pending between them in this court. Originally his brother was appointed as a Receiver by the Court but from 23-11-1984 the respondent was appointed as a Receiver The plots are lease-hold property taken from the D.D.A. under the standard D.D.A. lease. These are patent facts which cannot be denied. The petitioners claim that an oral lease was created in their favor on 1-12-1984 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/-. It was claimed that they had paid the three months rent in cash and rent for the months of April and May, 1985 by account payee cheques. The petitioners further claim that they registered themselves as a partnership firm on the same address, that they got their bank accounts in Lajpat Nagar bank, they got the telephone installed at the said place and put up advertisements of their business of purchase and sale of motor cars from the same address. It is alleged that on 8-6-1985 the respondent tried to forcibly dispossess the petitioners from the suit premises. A suit for permanent injunction was, thereforee, filed by them on 19-7-1985.
3. The respondent has denied creation of any tenancy oral or otherwise. He also denied the receipt of rent, as alleged. He has further pointed out that the so-sailed documents are much after the alleged creation of the tenancy and do not in any way show that the tenancy was created in favor of the petitioners.
4. The judgment of the Senior Sub Judge is attacked on the ground that he has not exercised the jurisdiction properly. The counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Gopal Krishan Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, 1973, R L R 542, Sahab Dayal Chamanlal v. M.C.D., 1976, R L R 550 and Smt. Shakuntala v. Hira Nand Sharma and Ors., : AIR1986Delhi27 . It is submitted on the basis of these decisions that the trial court must decide the prima facie case at the first sight or on the face of it. The court should not pre-judge the cases by judicial scrutiny or facts pleaded. It is submitted that in exercising jurisdiction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 the learned Sub-Judge had committed grave error.
5. I do not agree with this criticism of the impugned judgment. In Paras 5 and 6 of the judgment the learned Judge had looked to the facts which are staking in face at the first sight. The number of documents were presented by the petitioner in support of their prima facie claim of tenancy in their favor. By merely looking to the dates of those documents it could be seen that there was not a single contemporaneous document to show that the tenancy was created from 1-12-1984, So also it was clear by simple examination that there was not a single document written by the respondent showing the creation or acknowledgement of the creation of tenancy, that was produced by the petitioners. Another important factor which had weighed with the Senior Sub-Judge was the false assertions made by the petitioners that the rent was paid by accounts payee cheques for the months of April and May, 1986. I am in entire agreement with the Senior Sub-Judge that the petitioners have failed to show any prima facie case requiring the court to exercise its discretionary power in their favor.
6. Apart from these facts it would be most unreasonable to believe that a person who is appointed as a Receiver in a pending suit will create an oral tenancy in favor of a third party. So also it is too much to believe that such highly valuable property on the Ring Road measuring about 1000 sq. yards would be let out for Rs. 2,000/- a month. It cannot also be ignored that the property is a lease-hold property from the D.D.A. and the lease-deed prevents letting out the plots for commercial purposes. The court while exercising its discretionary and equitable power in granting temporary injunction cannot ignore these facts.
7. The preposition that the possession should not be disturbed without due process of law is always to be understood in the special context. The respondent found that the petitioners have committed a trespass on their property and, thereforee, made a report to the Police on 22/31-5-85. He then filed a F.I.R. to the Police on 15-6-1985. The respondent was thus following the due process of law to get his right vindicated. In the city of Delhi where we are every day flooded with the cases of encroachments even on Government properties, it would be contrary to justice, equity and rule of law to throw the entire burden on the original owner and leave the encroachers the benefit of possession. This injustice is farther compounded by the fact of long delays of disposal of cases in the courts. If at the end of the suit it is found that the petitioners have a legal right to the property the court has ample powers to restore the possession to the petitioners.
8. For the reasons stated above the Civil Revision is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 750/-.