Judgment:
R.L. Anand, J.
1. Tarlochan Singh son of Joginder Singh, resident M.E.S. Colony, Abohar, has filed the present bail application under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code in Case FIR No. 45 dated 6th May, 1997, Police Station City, Jallalabad, under Sections 304-B/34, Indian Penal Code.
2. The allegations of the prosecution can be described as follows:
3. Shri Balbir Singh son of Shri Kartar Singh, resident of Moga, gave his statement before the S.I. Sardool Singh of Police Station City, Jallalabad, stating as follows:
'I have five children - 2 boys and 3 girls. My two girls are married. The eldest girl Pushwinder Kaur is married to Jarnail Singh son of Bagga Singh since 1985 at Jallalabad. The next younger to her is married at Jalandhar. Her name is Namjit Kaur. The next younger to her Manjit Kaur was married on 12.2.1997 with Jaswinder Singh son of Tarlochan Singh, resident of Railway Road, Purana Satsang Ghar, Jallalabad. I married her according to the customs of society. I gave her one scooter, T.V., steel almirah, furniture, about 25 suits of clothes and eight tolas of gold - one Kada, three rings for grand mother and mother-in-law and one set to their daughter. Since the time of marriage my son-in-law Jaswinder Singh has been harassing my daughter. My daughter Manjit Kaur told me at Moga that her father-in-law, Tarlochan Singh, her sister-in-law Rimpi and her husband Jaswinder Singh harassed her very much and asked her to bring Rs. 50,000/- from her father, if she wanted to settle in their house. A week back I alongwith my eldest son-in-law and my daughter Pushwinder Kaur went to see my son-in-law Jaswinder Singh, his father Tarlochan Singh and sister Rimpi and make them understand. But they assured that they would not do it again. Yesterday in the evening my Son-in-law Jarnail Singh telephoned me at my house saying that Jaswinder Singh was harassing Manjit Kaur very much and asked me to take Jaswinder Kaur to Moga. When myself and my son reached at about 1 O' Clock at the house of Jaswinder Singh at Jallalabad to enquire, we learnt that my daughter Manjit Kaur after being harassed by her husband Jaswinder Singh, her father-in-law Tarlochan Singh and her sister-in-law Rimpi had set herself on fire at about 10 O'Clock after drenching herself with kerosene oil. On hearing the hue and cry, my eldest son-in-law alongwith his wife Pushwinder Kaur (whose house is near to the house of Jaswinder Singh) reached there and extinguished the fire and took Manjit Kaur to Civil Hospital and got her admitted. From there we learnt that as the condition of Manjit Kaur was serious, the doctor incharge sent her to Ferozepur Civil Hospital. When we went there my son-in-law Jarnail Singh met us near Village Khai on his return and told us that Manjit Kaur had died on the way. Jarnail Singh, my son-in-law told me that Manjit Kaur had handed over to her sister Pushwinder Kaur a letter at 9 A.M. in the morning in which she wrote that they harassed her. My daughter Manjit Kaur has died after setting herself on fire as she could not bear the harassment of her husband Jaswinder Singh, her sister-in-law Rimpi and her father-in-law Tarlochan Singh. The cause of grievance is that Manjit Kaur's husband and her father-in-law Tarlochan Singh harassed her and asked her to bring Rs. 50,000/-. My daughter could not tolerate all this and by drenching herself in kerosene oil, she committed suicide. We were taking the dead body to home when you have met us.
Sd/- Balbir Singh
son of Kartar Singh.'
4. The petitioner moved a bail application before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, who vide order dated 10th July, 1997 dismissed the same by observing as follows :
'The learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners were not living with the deceased. Tarlochan Singh is employed in M.E.S. and is living in M.E.S. Colony, Abohar Cantt. There are specific allegations, i.e. demand of additional dowry raised by the husband of Manjit Kaur. Jaswinder Singh, her father-in-law Tarlochan Singh and her sister-in-law Sukhjit Kaur alias Rimpi. The distance between Abohar and Jallalabad is not long one. The petitioner can come to Jallalabad daily after attending his duty. Death of Manjit Kaur has been caused within seven years of her marriage in the house of her in-laws and there are specific allegations regarding the demand of dowry. In these circumstances bail application of Tarlochan Singh accused is dismissed.'
5. Aggrieved by the said order, Shri Tarlochan Singh has filed the present bail application, which I am disposing of with the assistance rendered by Mr. A.S. Bakshi, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, and Mr. J.S. Brar, D.A.G., who opposed the bail application.
6. Before I proceed further, I may make a mention that deceased Manjit Kaur had died in the house of her in-laws just after 83 days of her marriage, which took place on 12.2.1997.
7. Making an endeavour for bail, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- was made after the lapse of sufficient time of the marriage between the deceased and her husband and it was not connected with the marriage of the deceased, therefore, this demand does not fall within the definition of 'dowry' as given in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and in these circumstances, the offence under Section 304-B, IPC, is not made out. In order to supplement his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows :
'In this act, 'Dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly;
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applied.'
8. The first submission raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is totally out of the context in view of the allegations of the F.D.R. lodged at the instance of Shri Balbir Singh, who was none else but the father of the deceased. A reading of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act would also make it clear that if the alleged demand even made after the marriage, but if it is in connection with the marriage of the deceased and her husband, it will still fall within the definition of 'Dowry' as defined in Section 2 above. If the allegations of the complainant are gone through, again it becomes clear that the complainant had alleged specifically that since the date of the marriage of his daughter, his son-in-law Jaswinder Singh had been harassing the deceased, besides the petitioner and his daughter Rimpi. So much so, the petitioner, his son and his daughter made a demand of Rs. 50,000/- from the deceased, in case she wanted to settle herself in her matrimonial home. The above line would indicate that the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- was in connection with the marriage of the deceased with her husband, and it was not an independent demand, though allegedly made after the marriage. In the opinion of this Court, the demand of Rs. 50,000/- has a direct nexus with the marriage and it had emanated right from the date of the marriage, because the petitioner and his co-accused were not satisfied with the dowry, which was brought by the deceased at the time of her marriage. With the greed of dowry, the petitioner and his co-accused had been pressurising the deceased to bring Rs. 50,000/- in case she wanted to rehabilitate herself in the house of the petitioner, who is none else but the head of the family.
9. It was next submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- was not made soon after the death and in these circumstances it cannot be said that it was a case of dowry death and the provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be attracted. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Sham Lal v. The State of Haryana, 1997 (3) RCR 85 :1997 (2) All India Criminal Law Reporter 393 (SC)=I (1997) CCR 231 (SC). This submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner can again be turned down with a short reason. It is settled principle of law that while deciding the bail application, the assertions of the complainant party are supposed to be assessed. At this juncture, I cannot assess the evidence which is to be led by the prosecution in the Trial Court. If the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- was being repeated till the date of the death of the deceased, certainly such demand would come soon before the death of the deceased. The allegations of the prosecution are very clear, which prima facie establish that the deceased was harassed and coerced by the petitioner and his co-accused in order to bring Rs. 50,000/- and on account of this coercion, the deceased had committed suicide by drenching herself in kerosene. Admittedly, Smt. Manjit Kaur had died under abnormal circumstances within 83 days of her marriage, in the house of her in-laws inviting prima facie presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
10. It was then submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that on the day of her death at about 9 a.m. in the morning, the deceased wrote a letter to her sister in which she had never complained about the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/-. The translation of the said letter has been read in extenso by me with the assistance rendered by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. I am of the view that the said letter was written in a different context, in which the deceased had narrated a tale of woes to her sister and brother-in-law, who used to reside in front of the house of the deceased. A reading of this letter would show that the deceased was complaining about the acts of cruelty in the house of her in-laws. She was so much depressed in the house of her in-laws that she was complaining in the letter that she was confined in a room and so much so, she was not allowed the facility of telephone, so that she may not be able to talk with her relations on the parental side. It has also been stated by the deceased in that letter that she was being treated as a menial servant and she was being suspected and for that reason her husband does not take food from her. The reading of the contents of the letter prima facie establish the extent of cruelty which the deceased was faced with in the house of her in-laws. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the deceased to make a mention of the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- in the said letter. A reading of this letter further suggests that the deceased had complained to her sister that her husband had not even spoken with her for the last eight days and he had been giving her taunts that his life had been spoiled.
11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then placed reliance upon Shanti and Ors. v. The State of Haryana, 1991 (2) RCR 55=I (1991) DMC 187; SHANKARPARSAD V. THE STATE, 1991 (2) RCR 165; and Baljit Singh v. The State (UT), 1996 (2) RCR 86 :1996 (2) All India Criminal Law Reporter 782=III (1996) CCR 73 (DB) (Pb. & Hry.), in order to convince this Court that presumption of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act would apply only if it is established prima facie that soon before the death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry.
12. These authorities are totally irrelevant for me when I am in the midst of deciding bail application, which is supposed to be disposed of by this Court, looking into the allegations levelled against the petitioner and his co-accused. I have already narrated above that as per allegations of the complainant, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and the demand of Rs. 50,000/- had occurred after the marriage which only survived for 83 days. So much so, even on the day of her death, the deceased exposed her mind in writing to her sister and her brother-in-law, showing the extent of cruelty with which she was subjected to in the house of her in-laws.
13. 'Demand of money', 'Demand of money', 'Demand of money' was consistenly hanging in the mind of the deceased. If a suffocating atmosphere is made in the matrimonial home, recoiling upon the mind of the deceased, would it not amount to an abetment under the law, is another point to be seen while deciding the bail application, if this Court even for the sake of moment agrees with the Counsel for the petitioner that the ingredients of Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code, read with Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, are not attracted. In the opinion of this Court, the demand of wealth, which was persistent, would constitute an act of 'abetment' and in these circumstances the ingredients of offence under Section 306, Indian Penal Code, are attracted and even in such like cases, the benefit of bail should not be extended to a person who has created such an atmosphere in the house, leading to the most tragic and painful death of an unfortunate lady, who could only survive for 83 days after her marriage.
14. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the deceased died on account of depression, rather than the alleged acts of cruelty. At the most the offence under Section 498, Indian Penal Code, is made out vis-a-vis the petitioner and in these circumstances the petitioner should be enlarged on bail. This argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not cut ice before me in view of the specific allegations against the petitioner, his son and his daughter. The allegations are coming from a most natural witness, who is none else, but the father of the deceased. Even the letter written by the deceased tells a long tale of woes, giving a good inclination under what circumstances the deceased resorted to the extreme step of taking her own life.
15. Summing up the above discussion on, this Court is of the opinion that the discretion of bail cannot be exercised in favour of the petitioner on account of the serious allegations levelled against him.
16. Resultantly, I do not see any merit in the bail application. The same is hereby dismissed.
17. Nothing stated above would amount to an expression of my opinion on the merits of the case and my above observations will be considered limited for the purpose of the present bail application only.