Judgment:
V.K. Bali, J.
1. Petitioner-workman through present petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeks quashing of award dated March 27, 1991 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhatinda vide which reference made by the Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act was answered against him.
2. From the pleadings of the parties as also the award under challenge, it is apparent that the petitioner worked with the respondent management as Chowkidar from 8.8.1980 to 5.9.1981 and thereafter from 1.5.1985 to 14.6.1986. As per his case, the management terminated his services even though he was in the employment of respondent-management for a continuous period of 240 days and, thus, the provisions of Section 25F had not been complied with. The Labour Court denied the relief to the petitioner-workman on the basis of letter written by the workman to the District Manager Markfed Exhibit Ml which was proved by one Shri Atul Singla, Handwriting and Finger Print Expert Patiala who appeared as MW2 and gave his opinion that the said letter was actually written by the petitioner-workman as it is his thumb impression which was available on this document. The contents of letter, referred to above, read as follows:-
' It is requested that I Jagir Singh son of Ram Singh, Village Kaler, who was working with you as daily paid Chowkidar during the year 1980-81 and I of my own accord and free will have been leaving the job and doing other work. Now I am working for the last about two years in Golden Rice Mill Jalalo Anana Road, Kotkapura. I hereby submit the application. If it is possible, I may be accommodated again in your Department.'
3. This letter is dated 2.6.1988. Mr. Harinder Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that there was no question for the workman to have written the letter, referred to above, when he had served a demand notice on the management on 11.4.1988 and the letter in question was manipulated by the management before filing the reply which was actually filed on 24.6.1988. He further contends that writing letter by the petitioner after serving demand notice should be disbelieved, the letter having been manipulated as writing such a letter after serving demand notice was against normal human conduct. The argument appears to be attractive but if the same is examined, vis-a-vis facts of this case, it would not have any substance. It is proved on the records of the case that even though petitioner workman was no more in the employment of the respondent-management with effect from 15.6.1986, the demand notice was served on 11.4.1988 after a period of about two years. The contents of letter as referred to above, clearly manifest that workman was in the employment of some other concern. In case the petitioner was aggrieved of his termination, he would have served demand notice immediately or within some reasonable time. The very fact that the demand notice was served after such a long time, in my view, proves the fact that he was actually working somewhere else as mentioned in his letter referred to above. Even though he served demand notice, he prayed that he be accommodated as he had been relieved from the concern where he was working at that time.
4. The contention of Mr. Sharma that even if it was a case of abandonment, the same would be retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was necessary has, however, substance. The learned counsel relies upon recent judgment of this Court in 'Hari Singh v. Presiding Officer and Anr., 1993(2) Service Law Reporter 745 in which after relying upon decision of Supreme Court in The Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh, 1990(4) S.L.R. 154 (SC) and L. Robert 'D' Souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, 1982(1) SLR 864 (SC), a single Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that abandonment of job by the workman amounts to termination and consequently retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Once it is so, the provisions of Section 25F are required to be complied with which, inter-alia, provide for a notice or wages in lieu of notice period besides retrenchment compensation. Even if this is the position of law but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the workman does not deserve any relief. He abandoned the job in June, 1986 and served the management with the demand notice after a period of about two years. All this while, he was serving in some other concern with some other employer and once he was shunted out from there, he wanted to be accommodated with his previous employer i.e. the respondent-management. The conduct of the workman, as has been noticed above, would not entitle him to any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even though there may be infringement of law, in given facts and circumstances, it is always open to the Court under writ jurisdiction to decline the relief. The workman, who abandoned the job and joined other concern, after long years, cannot ask for re-instatement on the ground that even though he had abandoned the job but for non-compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he was entitled to re-instatement with back wages. There is no equity in favour of petitioner and as mentioned above his conduct does not entitle him to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. For the reasons given above, this petition is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.