Judgment:
ORDER
Abhay M. Naik, J.
1. Short facts giving rise to this Civil Revision are that Shri Bhagchand Sharma had an Insurance Policy against his life bearing No. S/341332096 for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand) issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India on 27-3-1990. The respondents are the daughters of Bhagchand Sharma, who became unwell during his duty hours and was admitted to the Government District Hospital, Khandwa. Bhagchand Sharma died during his treatment in the Hospital. The matter was reported to the police who got the post mortem performed on the body of deceased Bhagchand Sharma, No offence was found to have been committed and accordingly, the concerning police station closed the case of death of Bhagchand Sharma. The factum of death was informed to the Life Insurance Corporation of India. There was one more Policy of Insurance bearingNo. S/341331808 against the life of Bhagchand Sharma for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand). The claim was submitted for the assured money with respect to both the aforesaid policies. The amount of insurance payable under the Policy No. S/341331808 to the tune of Rs. 10,796/- (Rupees Ten thousand seven hundred and ninety six), was paid, whereas the amount payable under the Policy bearing No. 341332096 was not paid at all. So the plaintiff issued a demand notice dated 13-8-1998 requesting thereby to make a payment of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) along with interest payable against the said policy. The defendants/applicants sent a reply dated 7-8-1998, stating thereby that Bhagchand Sharma had committed suicide within one year from the date of issuance of the Insurance Policy and no amount was, therefore, payable under the said Policy. The plaintiffs contended that Bhagchand Sharma had not committed suicide and the amount payable under the said policy ought to have been paid with interest to the plaintiffs. Hence, they instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with interest.
2. The defendants/applicants submitted their written statement. They specifically averred that Bhagchand Sharma committed suicide within one year from the date of issuance of the subject policy. So, no money is payable under the said policy. Apart from this, it has been stated in the written statement that the suit instituted in the month of August, 2000, is barred by limitation because the cause of action must have arisen on 31-1-1991.
3. The learned Trial Judge after recording the evidence dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on 13-9-2002 with a finding that Aluminum Phosphide and Ethyl Alcohol were found in the viscera of the deceased. Accordingly, the learned Trial Judge concluded that the death of Bhagchand Sharma fell in the category of suicide. So the plea of the Life Insurance Corporation of India was upheld that no money was payable under the said policy since Bhagchand Sharma had committed suicide within one year from the date of policy. However, the learned Trial Judge held that the suit of the plaintiffs was not barred by limitation but was within limitation.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, an appeal was preferred before the Lower Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. During pendency of this appeal, the name of original plaintiff No. 1 Smt. Brijlata Sharma was deleted and the appeal was continued on behalf of present respondents who are the children of the deceased Bhagchand Sharma. Learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal holding that it is not proved by the defendants/revisionists that Bhagchand Sharma had committed suicide. In the absence of any such proof, the suit of the plaintiffs was found liable to be allowed by the learned Lower Appellate Court. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was allowed and the suit has been decreed by the learned Lower Appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs. Since the suit giving rise to the present appeal was for recovery of money to the tune of Rs, 20,0007- (Rupees twenty thousand), the defendants/revisionists preferred the present revision application before this Court.
5. Shri V.S. Choudhary and Shri Ramesh Shrivastava, learned Counsels, appearing for the defendants/revisionists and plaintiffs/respondents advanced their arguments. Main contentions on behalf of the revisionists are:
(i) The assured, namely, Bhagchand Sharma has committed suicide within one year from the date of the issuance of the policy and therefore, by virtue of Clause 6 of the Policy of Insurance contained in Ex. D-7, no amount is payable against the said policy.
(ii) The findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge while dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs were reversed by the learned Lower Appellate Court with perversity.
(iii) Suit of the plaintiffs being barred by limitation, it could not have been decreed by the learned Lower Appellate Court.
6. Shri Ramesh Shrivastava, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents countered the submissions and urged that the impugned judgment and decree are quite valid and are not liable to be interfered within exercise of the revisory jurisdiction of this Court.
7. Considered the submission and perused the record. First question coming up for consideration on the basis of the rival submissions is that whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the sum assured against the subject Policy bearing No. S/341332096. A format of the Insurance Policy is on record as Ex. D-7 whose contents are not disputed by either parties. Clause 6 of it is relevant which is reproduced below:
6. Suicide.-- This Policy shall be void if the Life Assured commits suicide (whether sane or insane at the time) at any time on or after the date on which the risk under the policy has commenced but before the expiry of one year from the date of this policy and the Corporation will not entertain any claim by virtue of this policy except to the extent of a third party's bonafide beneficial interest acquired in the policy of valuable consideration of which notice has been given in writing to the office to which premiums under this policy were paid last atleast one calendar month prior to death.
8. Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, is a beneficial piece of Legislation. It was enacted to ensure absolutely security to the policy holder in the matter of his life insurance protection. Naturally, if a claimant is to be deprived of the benefit under the insurance policy, a burden is to be discharged by the Insurance Company in a very strict manner in order to prove that the policy holder did commit suicide within one year from the date of issuance of the policy. The probabilities, howsoever strong, they can not take the shape of proof itself. The defendants in order to dislodge the plaintiff is required to prove by specific and cogent evidence that the assured did not commit suicide. It is true that Aluminum Phosphide (Sulphos Pesticide) & Ethyl Alcohol, were found to have contained in the viscera of the deceased. This is clearly established by Ex. D-2/C. However, the pesticide could have been taken by the deceased voluntarily or could have been administered by third person or could have been consumed unknowingly. It is only if it is consumed voluntarily, aforesaid Clause 6 of the Insurance Policy would come into play. In case of remaining two eventualities, Clause 6 (supra) can not be applied at all. It is true that the plaintiffs did not take a plea that the pesticide was administered by some third person or the same was consumed by the deceased unknowingly. However, the plaintiffs have clearly averred in Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the plaint that Bhagchand Sharma' was discharging his duties in a routine manner in his office. While discharging the duties, he became unwell and was admitted to the Government Hospital for treatment. He died during the treatment itself. Thus, the plaintiffs have nowhere averred that Bhagchand Sharma consumed the poisonous item voluntarily. On the contrary, it is the contention of the defendants/revisionists in the written statement that Bhagchand Sharma committed suicide. In view of the specific plea, it was obligatory on the part of the defendants/revisionists to prove by positive evidence that Bhagchand Sharma did commit suicide. The essence of suicide is an intentional self-destruction of life. If, therefore, a person takes an overdose of poison by mistake, or in a state of intoxication, or in order to evade his arrest by his pursuers, he could not be held accountable for his action. But, if there was an intention to commit suicide, and an attempt for that purpose was made, the accused could not escape responsibility for his action, except on the ground of insanity. This Court in the case of Mohanlal v. The State of M.R, reported as 1992 Cr.LR (MP) 124, held that all the evidence collected was that the applicant had consumed some poisonous substance but there is no evidence as to whether the poisonous substance was taken accidentally or intentionally. Accordingly, this Court in the case of Mohanlal (supra) held that the accused could not be convicted for the offence of an attempt to commit suicide.
9. In this view of the matter the defendants were obviously obliged to establish by cogent and positive evidence that Bhagchand Sharma did commit suicide. The sole witness appearing on behalf of the defendants/revisionist was Sudhir who happened to be Assistant Administrative Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India at Khandwa. His entire statement is based upon the record of the Police Department. It was admitted in Paragraph 11 of his statement that there was no proof with the Life Insurance Corporation that Bhagchand Sharma consumed poison. Further he has admitted in Paragraph 14 of his statement th.at none of the employees of Life Insurance Corporation of India has recorded any statement that deceased Bhagchand had committed suicide. This witness has relied upon the police record. Post-mortem report is contained in Ex. P-3. It has been observed by the Police Officer on the application for post-mortem that according to the information gathered by police, the deceased had consumed some poisonous item and the death seemed to have been caused by, it. The doctor has categorically mentioned in the post-mortem report in the following words:
In my opinion death caused due to cardio respiratory arrest. No definite opinion can be given. However, visceras preserved to rule out any poisoning and for chemical analysis and death in 24 hours.
10. Obviously, the post-mortem report is no proof of actual commission of crime. It merely provides inference on the basis of scientific examination. Moreover, the plaintiff has clearly denied in their evidence that the deceased Bhagchand had committed suicide. In the absence of any positive evidence, the finding of the Lower Appellate Court can not be disturbed in exercise of the revisory jurisdiction by this Court. Likewise, the Lower Appellate Court is not found to have committed any mistake in reversing the finding of the Trial Court which was not based on any specific evidence. One more important feature of this case is that the Life Insurance Corporation was required to make investigation about the cause of death according to the provisions contained in the Mannual of Life Insurance Corporation of India. Under the Mannual, death claims are categorised into two classes: (i) Early or premature claims viz., claims arising within two years from the date of risk or revival on the basis of-evidence of health; and (ii) other or ordinary claims. Chapter III of the said Mannual provides that investigation into the bonafides of the claim under a policy which has not run for two years from the date of risk or revival, should be started immediately without waiting for the completed claim forms. The Office should note to pass on to the investigator any useful information which maybe available from the completed Claims Forms when received as this would greatly assist the investigator in his job. Thus, investigation ought to have been conducted by the Life Insurance Corporation of India through its investigator. Although,the record of the Life Insurance Corporation is stated to have been destroyed but the Corporation has not chosen to examine any investigator. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that any investigation was conducted by investigator in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mannual. In the absence of any investigation having been made, it may be inferred that the Life Insurance Corporation did not treat death of Bhagchand Sharma as a case of suicide and it is only on the basis of Police record that such a plea has been taken in the written statement. It has been stated by the witness that the record of the Life Insurance Corporation has been destroyed as per Annexure D-6/C. However, the plaintiffs can not be put to any disadvantageous position on account of such alleged destruction of record. In order to succeed, it was necessary for the defendants to prove the commission of suicide on the part of the deceased. Without producing such evidence, the defendants can not succeed.
11. This Court is also required to examine the scope of revisory powers. The impugned judgment and decree has been passed by the Lower Appellate Court in exercise of appellate powers under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Second Appeal has been expressly barred by virtue of Section 102 of Civil Procedure Code. Naturally revisory powers can not be taken as substitute for Second Appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v.Tuffail Mohammed, reported as : AIR1991SC455 , has already held:
The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact of the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the Courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.
12. No perversity could be pointed out by the learned Counsel for the revisionits in the impugned judgment and decree. The findings of the Lower Appellate Court are based on correct appreciation of the evidence on record and the same are not liable to be interfered with, in exercise of the limited powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
13. As regards question of limitation, it is suffice to say that both the Courts below have concurrently held the suit to be within limitation. According to the defendants/revisionists, the claim of the plaintiffs was rejected in July, 1993 and the same was intimated to the plaintiffs by letter dated 6-7-1993. No such document is on record to establish that the plaintiffs were intimated about rejection of their claim in the year 1993. On the contrary, the plaintiffs have based their claim on the letter dated 7-9-1998 contained in Ex. P-2. Both the Courts below have rightly worked out the limitation for the plaintiffs on the basis of this letter. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs can not be said to be beyond limitation.
14. Learned Counsel for the defendants/revisionists argued that the plaintiffs having availed the remedy before District Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum vide Ex. D-4/C are not entitled to sue the defendants/ revisionists without seeking a prayer for setting aside the order of the Forum. However, the document Ex. D-4/C is found to be in respect of death of one Praveen Kelkar whereas, the name of the deceased in the present case is Bhagchand Sharma. Obviously, Ex. D-4/C is neither relevant nor material in the present case and has no bearing in the present case.
15. In the result, the revision is without any substance and, consequently, fails. The same is dismissed with costs, quantified at Rs. 1,000/- (One thousand).