Skip to content


A. Ramachandra Naidu Vs. the Chittoor Dist. Central Co-operative Stores Ltd. and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation

Subject

Trusts and Societies;Company

Court

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Decided On

Case Number

Civil Revision Petition No. 3474 of 1990

Judge

Reported in

AIR1994AP70; 1993(3)ALT276; [1995]84CompCas656(AP)

Acts

Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 - Sections 48, 91(1) and 121(2); Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 9, Rule 9

Appellant

A. Ramachandra Naidu

Respondent

The Chittoor Dist. Central Co-operative Stores Ltd. and Others

Advocates:

Sri A. Rangacharyulu, Adv.

Excerpt:


.....is suffered or death occurs during his employment, is recognised not only under workmens compensation act, but also under benevolent provisions under section 166 and 167 of the m.v. act. the right of driver to seek compensation is not restricted only to the workmens compensation act, it has been enlarged to enable such person to seek just compensation (sections 166 and 168), conferring upon him the right of election engrafted under section 167 of the act to choose either of the two forum. the only defence which the insurer could take is limit of its liability as enumerated under section 147 of the act, leading to contest, inter alia, only between insured and insurer and does not impact claimants right to recover the compensation determined by the tribunal which crystallizes into enforceable right against both. in the instant case, the claimant/driver has exercised right of election under section 167 of the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in..........the respondent-society. it is statedthat the suit was dismissed for default. therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file i.a.no. 1537 of 1989 under order ix, rule 9 ofcivil procedure code seeking restoration ofthe suit. while so, during the pendency of thesuit, the respondent-society went into liquidation and was taken up by a liquidator and,therefore, it became necessary on the part ofthe petitioner-plaintiff to implead the liquidator as one of the respondent-defendants inthe suit. under the above circumstances thesaid i.a. 467 of 1990 was (sic) lowercourt dismissed the said allowing thedecision in k. satyanaraya v. motu industries, 1961 (1) an vr m (sic). the abovedecision referred by the court below is asunder :--'failure to obtain sanction of the registrar for the institution of the suit, as required by section 48 of the act, is fatal to its maintainability as according to that section the suit shall not lie or be proceeded with except by leave of the registrar. as the requirement is in the nature of a condition precedent, the subsequent leave of the registrar would not cure the defect.' according to the above decision, the requirement under section 48 of the old act.....

Judgment:


ORDER

1. Aggrieved by the order of the Principal District Munsif, Chittor in I.A. No. 467 of 1990 in LA. No. 1537 of 1989 in O.S. No. 569 of 1986, this Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner-plaintiff.

2. The short question that falls for consideration in this C.R.P., is the proper interpretation of the provisions of Section 121 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short, 'the Act').

3. The petitioner-plaintiff filed I.A.No. 467 of 1990 seeking permission to im-plead the Liquidator as one of the respondents-defendants in I.A. No. 137 of 1989 aswell as in the suit O.S. No. 569 of 1986, filedby the petitioner. The petitioner filed the suitO.S. 569 of 1986 for permanent injunctionregarding the vacant site let out to the petitioner by the respondent-society. It is statedthat the suit was dismissed for default. Therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file I.A.No. 1537 of 1989 under Order IX, Rule 9 ofCivil Procedure Code seeking restoration ofthe suit. While so, during the pendency of thesuit, the respondent-society went into liquidation and was taken up by a liquidator and,therefore, it became necessary on the part ofthe petitioner-plaintiff to implead the liquidator as one of the respondent-defendants inthe suit. Under the above circumstances thesaid I.A. 467 of 1990 was (sic) lowerCourt dismissed the said allowing thedecision in K. Satyanaraya V. Motu Industries, 1961 (1) An VR m (sic). The abovedecision referred by the Court below is asunder :--

'Failure to obtain sanction of the registrar for the institution of the suit, as required by Section 48 of the Act, is fatal to its maintainability as according to that section the suit shall not lie or be proceeded with except by leave of the Registrar. As the requirement is in the nature of a condition precedent, the subsequent leave of the Registrar would not cure the defect.' According to the above decision, the requirement under Section 48 of the old Act is that the sanction of the Registrar has to be obtained before litigating against the society and therefore, the lower Court basing on the same principle dismissed the application.

4. Sri Rangacharyulu, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed before me the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in D.M. Co-op. Bank v. Dalichand, : [1969]1SCR887 , which was followed by the learned single Judge of this Court in West Godavari District Marketing Society v. K. R. Chandra Chowdary, 1981 (1) An WR 5. In order to distinguish the intricacies, it is necessaryto extract Section 121 of the Act, which reads thus:

'Bar of Jurisdiction of Court:

(1) No order passed, decision or action taken or direction issued under this Act by an arbitrator, a liquidator, the Registrar or an officer or person authorised or empowered by him, the Tribunal or the Government or any officer subordinate to them, shall be liable to be called in question in any Court.

(2) While a society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceeding relating to the business of such society shall be proceeded with, or instituted against, the liquidator as such or against the society or any member thereof on any matter touching the affairs of the society except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose:

Provided that where the order of winding up is cancelled, the provisions of this subsection shall cease to apply in relation to the society and any member thereof, but shall continue to apply to the person who acted as liquidator.'

5. According to the provisions of the above section, where a society is being wound up, no suit or legal proceedings could be initiated unless and until the prior permission of the Registrar is obtained when the issue touching the business of the society or touching the affairs of the society is involved. According to this provision, there are two aspects i.e., proceedings relating to the business of the society and matter touching the affairs of the society. If any of the above aspects is involved, no proceedings could be initiated unless and until permission is obtained from the Registrar of the societies. Construing similar provision and the words used in the provision as to business of the society and as to touching the affairs of the society the Supreme Court in D.M. Co-op. Bank v. Dalichand (supra) held thus at page 1325 :--

'The principal questions which arise on the interpretation of Section 91 are two :(1) What is the meaning of the expression 'touching the business of the society' and (2) what is themeaning of the expression 'a person claiming through a member' which occurs in Sec-tion91(1)(b)?

The answer depends on the words used in the Act. Although number of cases have been cited to us on similar expressions contained in various other Acts, both Indian and English, in the first instance, it is advisable to restrict the enquiry to the terms of the enactment itself, because the legislatures have been changing the words and expanding the scope of references to arbitrators or to the Registrars step by step. The sentence, namely, 'notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force' clearly ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts if the dispute falls squarely within the ambit of Section 91(1). Five kinds of disputes are mentioned in sub-section (1); first, disputes touching the constitution of a society; secondly, disputes touching election of the officebearers of a society; thirdly disputes touching the conduct of general meetings of a society; fourthly, disputes touching the management of a society; and fifthly, disputes touching the business of a society. It is clear that the word 'business' in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of officebearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affairs of a society. In this sub-section the word 'business' has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws.'

6. It is further observed by the Supreme Court as follows:--

'The question arises whether the dispute touching the assets of a society would be a dispute touching the business of a society. This would depend on the nature of the society and the rules and bye-laws governing it. Ordinarily, if a society owns buildings and lets out parts of buildings which it does not require for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But it maybe that it is the business of a society to construct and buyhouses and let them out to its members. In that case letting out property may be part of its business. In this case, the society is a cooperative bank and ordinarily a co-operative bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it. Therefore, it seems to us that the present dispute between a tenant and a member of the bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank.'

7. As observed by the Supreme Court, the activity of the respondent-society is a cooperative store dealing in sale of goods. The relief sought for by the petitioner is not to dispossess him from the vacant site, which is leased out to him. Therefore, leasing out of the premises to the petitioner cannot form part of the main business activity of the society and, therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court the permission of the Registrar is not necessary in the present context.

8. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in D. M. Co-op. Bank v. Dalichand (supra), this Court in West Godavari District Marketing Society v. K. R. Chandra Chowdary (supra) observed as under :--

'The Supreme Court finally held that the Registrar was not empowered to alter 'service conditions' and adjudicate disputes in arbitrations under Section 61 of the Act. Therer fore, the words were read down to exclude service conditions and in this view of meaning and interpretation of the above words, the case in Co-operative Marketing Society v. Venkatanarasirnha Rao, 1969(1) An WR 409 is no more good law. The words 'touching the Constitution, management of the business of a society' therefore do not touch the relief pertaining to service conditions under the Act. In that view this plea of the society that the instant suit without notice under Section 120 of the Act cannot be countenanced.'

9. As observed by this Court basing on the decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the question raised in this Civil Revision Petition is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court as well as thedecision of this Court. Therefore, I hold that the permission of the Registrar under Section 121(2) of the Act is not necessary when the relief sought for by the petitioner is not falling under any of the activities of the respondent-society, namely, business of the society and the matter touching the affairs of the society. Therefore, in my view, the lower Court has not properly construed the provisions of Section 121 of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No order as to costs.

10. Revision allowed.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organize Client Files //