Judgment:
ORDER
S.N. Variava, J.
1. This is a Contempt Notice of Motion. The facts are as follows :
The Applicants herein had filed an Application under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 being Application (BIR) No. 485 of 1985. On 6th October 1987 the following order was passed :
'1. It is hereby declared that the applicant continues in the employment of the opponent-Company with consequential benefits, except for the back wages for the period upto 7-11-1984 and onwards.
2. The Applicant is not entitled to back wages upto 7-11-1984. He is entitled to back wages at the rate of 50% from 8th November, 1984
3. No order as to costs'.
2. The Petitioners herein preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court bearing (IC) No. 174 of 1987. The same came to be summarily dismissed on 29th September, 1989.
3. The Petitioners filed in this Court Writ Petition No. 1615 of 1991. On 18th December, 1992 the same was dismissed with the following order :-
P. C. : Heard Counsel
Since the point raised in this petition is finally concluded by the Judgment of the Supreme Court is S. L. P. No. 12011 of 1987 and other connected matters dated 24th November, 1992 nothing survives in this petition.
Petition rejected summarily'.
4. This Contempt Motion is taken out on 17th February, 1993. It is alleged that the Appellants reported for work, but no work was assigned to him nor any amounts are paid to him. It is alleged that the Order of the Court has been flouted and that contempt has been committed.
5. Mrs. Mhatre relying upon the authority in the case of Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar & Ors. v. Sophy Keely & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 CLR 312 submitted that the Orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court merged into the order of High Court and that therefore the contempt is of the Order of the High Court.
6. I am unable to accept this submission. In Shelar's case (supra), the High Court and the Appellate Court gave reasoned Order while dismissing the Writ Petition and the Appeal. It was by those reasoned Orders that the Order of the Labour Court was accepted. It is because of that that this Court held that the Order of the Labour Court had merged into the Order of the High Court. In the present case, both the Industrial Court as well as this Court has summarily dismissed the Appeal and the Writ Petition respectively. In my view, in such cases it cannot be said that the Order of the Labour Court has merged into the Order of this Court. The contempt, if any, therefore would be that of the Order dated 6th October, 1987 passed by the Labour Court.
7. Mrs. Mhatre next submitted that even though the contempt may be of the Order of the Labour Court, this Court would still have jurisdiction to entertain and try this Contempt Notice of Motion. She submitted that Rule 18 of the Contempt Rules as appearing in Chapter XXXIV of the Appellate Side Rules merely provides that every petition or a reference in contempt of a subordinate Court or a Bench of the high Court presided over by a Single Bench would be heard and disposed off by a Single Judge. She submits that this Rule does not provide that the Single Judge must be a Judge on the Appellate Side. She submits that it may be disposed off by a Single Judge sitting either on the Original Side or the Appellate Side. She also refers to Rule 19 which says that where a contempt arises out of the proceedings on the Original Side, then Petition shall be filed on the Original Side and shall be in the form of a Notice of Motion. She submits that Rule 19 specifically makes a mention about contempt arising out of proceedings on the Original Side. She submits that wherever in the Rules it was necessary to mention the 'Original Side' or the 'Appellate Side', the Rules so make a mention. She submits that as Rule 18 is silent in this respect, it is clear that even a Single Judge sitting on the Original Side can entertain and try a Contempt Petition for a contempt of a Lower Court.
8. I am unable to accept this submission also. This Court is sitting and exercising its Original Jurisdiction and is taking up such matters as are assigned to it by the learned Chief Justice. The assignment of this Court does not permit it to take up matters in contempt of the Subordinate Courts. Even otherwise, in my view, Rule 19 is very clear. It is only when a contempt arises out of the proceedings on the Original Side that a Notice of Motion can be filed on the Original Side. In all other cases contempt proceedings must be on the Appellate Side. It is for that reason that the Rules regarding contempt have been framed in the Appellate Side Rules.
9. Mrs. Mhatre next submitted that ultimately it is question of form. She submitted that if this Court comes to the conclusion that this Court sitting on the Original Side cannot try contempt of the orders of the subordinate Court, then this Court should transfer this Motion to the Appellate Side.
10. Mr. Singhavi has opposed this application. He has submitted that this Court should not exercise its discretion to transfer this matter from the Original Side to the Appellate Side.
11. So far as the Application for transfer is concerned, it must be admitted that this Court was inclined to transfer the matter to the Appellate Side. However, it appears to this Court that no useful purpose would be served by transferring this matter to the Appellate Side. This because under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. As stated above, the contempt is of the Order dated 6th October, 1987. Even presuming that the filling of this Motion be considered as an initiation of proceeding, on the date that this Motion was filed the proceedings would be barred under Section 20 of the contempt of Courts Act. In such a case, to transfer, this Motion to the Appellate Side would be futile. For that reason I do not exercise my discretion.
12. Under these circumstances, the Notice of Motion stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.