Judgment:
1. By the judgment, dated 04.04.2013, passed, in Sessions Trial No. 261 of 2009, by learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge III, Gaya, the appellant, Umesh Ravidas, stands convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. In consequence of his conviction, the appellant stands, under the order, dated 10.04.2013, sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-.
2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described as under:
(i) On 11.06.1994, at about 7:30 AM, Ram Briksh Ravidas went to village Pathara to collect sugarcane leaves from village Pathara. On his return to his village, when Ram Briksh Ravidas reached a place called Aahar, accused Umesh Ravidas and accused Rambali Ravidas, who were sitting under a sheesam tree, noticed Ram Briksh Ravidas coming with leaves of sugarcane on his head. Having noticed Ram Briksh Ravidas so coming with sugarcane leaves on his head, accused Umesh Ravidas, who was holding a knife in his hand, stabbed the knife into the abdomen of Ram Briksh Ravidas. On being so stabbed, Ram Briksh Ravidas fell down and when accused Umesh Ravidas made, again, an attempt to stab Ram Briksh Ravidas by means of knife, Ram Briksh Ravidas saved himself by catching hold of, with the help of both his hands, accused Umesh Ravidas. This resulted into injuries caused to the left palm and right hand of Ram Briksh Ravidas. In the meanwhile, as some other persons, on hearing halla, proceeded towards the place of occurrence, accused Umesh Ravidas and his associate, accused Rambali Ravidas, fled away. Covering the injury caused to his abdomen, Ram Briksh Ravidas reached near the house of Balkeshar Ravidas, whose members of the family carried Ram Briksh Ravidas to the Amas hospital.
(ii) While Ram Briksh Ravidas was lying under treatment, police arrived there and recorded fardbayan of Ram Briksh Ravidas.
(iii) Treating the said fardbayan as the First Information Report, Amas Police Station Case No. 35 of 1994, under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered, on 11.06.1994, against accused Umesh Ravidas and accused Rambali Ravidas. While remaining under treatment, since Ram Briksh Ravidas died, Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was, later on, added to the case aforementioned.
(iv) During investigation, inquest was held over Ram Briksh Ravidass dead body, which was also subjected to post mortem examination, and, on completion of investigation, charge sheet was laid, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, against accused Umesh Ravidas.
3. At the trial, when a charge, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, was framed against accused Umesh Ravidas, he pleaded not guilty thereto.
4. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 8 (eight) witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, in his examination aforementioned, the accused denied that he had committed the offence, which was alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being, in brief, thus: The accused is completely innocent. There has been land dispute between the accused and the deceased. On the day of the occurrence, the deceased, while returning home, with sugarcane leaves on his head, was passing through the road, he fell down on the boulders and, as a result of the fall, he sustained injuries on his stomach; but on account of his animosity with the accused, the said deceased implicated falsely accused Umesh Ravidas despite the fact that the accused was completely innocent.
5. In support of his case, accused, too, adduced evidence by examining 4 (four) witnesses.
6. Having, however, found the accused guilty of the offence, which he stood charged with, learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned above.
7. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence, which has been passed against him, the accused has preferred this appeal.
8. We have heard Mr. Nand Kishore Prasad Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Ashwini Kumar Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State.
9. While considering the present appeal, what attracts the attention, most prominently, is that in the case at hand, the doctor, who had treated the said deceased, while the latter was undergoing treatment at Amas hospital, has not been examined. This apart, even the doctor, who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of Ram Briksh Ravidas and determined the cause of his death, was not examined nor was examined the Investigating Officer.
10. Out of the 8 (eight) witnesses, who have been examined by the prosecution, all the witnesses other than PW 1, namely, Jagdish Ravidas, and PW 2, namely, Laxmi Ram, had turned hostile and the witnesses, who have so turned hostile, mainly deposed that they had no knowledge about the occurrence and were not aware of the facts as to how Ram Briksh Ravidas had sustained injuries and how he had died.
11. Before proceeding further, it is also important to note that as far as PW 1 is concerned, his evidence is that on the day of the occurrence, at about 7:00 AM, on hearing halla, when he came running, he saw accused Umesh Ravidas running towards south, having a blood-stained knife in his hand and accused Rambali Ravidas running towards north and that he also noticed injury on the right side of the stomach of Ram Briksh Ravidas. It is in the evident of PW 1 that the said injury appeared to him to have been caused by knife and, on being asked by Ram Briksh Ravidas, Ram Briksh Ravidas said that Rambali had caught him and Umesh had stabbed him by knife. It is also in the evidence of PW 1 that on being asked by Ram Briksh Ravidas, he took Ram Briksh Ravidas to the Police Station. It is the further evidence of PW 1 that the occurrence had been seen by Laxmi Ravidas (PW 2), Sukhdeo Ravidas, Bishun Ravidas (PW 5), Indradeo Ravidas (PW 3) and Ambika Ravidas. In his evidence, PW 1 has clarified that it was Ram Briksh Ravidas himself, who had given the information, as regards the occurrence, to police and, thereafter, Ram Briksh Ravidas was sent to Gaya hospital and Ram Briksh Ravidas died in the evening.
12. Though the defence has put PW 1 to cross-examination, nothing was elicited from his cross-examination to show that what this witness had deposed was untrue or false. In fact, explaining as to how he (PW 1) happened to be present near the place of occurrence, PW 1 has deposed that he was coming, at that time, after having answered the call of nature and, therefore, had in his hand, a lota (i.e. pot, wherein water is, ordinarily, carried). It is in the evidence of PW 1 that on hearing halla, he was the first one to arrive at the place of occurrence and that he had seen blood on the ground and also on the cloth of the said deceased. It has been admitted by PW 1 that there was a dispute between Ram Briksh Ravidas, on the one hand, and Umesh Ravidas, on the other, with regard to their respective shares in their property.
13. What we notice is that from the cross-examination of PW 1, nothing could be elicited by the defence to show that what this witnesses had deposed was untrue or false. Thus, the evidence of PW 1 remained intact and his evidence clearly showed that he was the first person to have been reported by injured Ram Briksh Ravidas that he (Ram Briksh Ravidas) had been stabbed, on his abdomen, by Umesh Ravidas, while Rambali Ravidas kept holding him (Ram Briksh Ravidas).
14. On the heels of PW 1, PW 2 has deposed that on the day of occurrence, on halla being heard, he saw Ram Briksh Ravidas coming and, while so coming forward, Ram Briksh Ravidas was weeping catching hold of his stomach and he was saying that Umesh and Rambali had given him dagger blow and that Umesh had fled away towards south and Rambali towards north and, thereafter, people took the injured to hospital. It is in the evidence of PW 2 that he (PW 2), too, accompanied the injured to Police Station, where the injured gave his statement that Rambali and Umesh had given him dagger blow and, thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station sent the injured to Amas hospital, where the doctor advised that Ram Briksh Ravidas be sent to Gaya hospital and, thereafter, he does not know anything.
15. Even from the cross-examination of PW 2, nothing could be elicited by the defence to show that what this witness had deposed was untrue or false. The evidence of PW 2 cannot, therefore, be taken to have been shaken by cross-examination. The evidence of PW 2, too, thus, remains wholly intact.
16. In fact, while cross-examining PW 1 and PW 2, who had supported the case of the prosecution, it was not even suggested to them by the defence that Ram Briksh Ravidas had sustained injury by falling on the boulders. Thus, while cross-examining PW 1 and PW 2, no foundation was laid by the defence of its case that Ram Briksh Ravidas had sustained injury by falling on the boulders.
17. In the backdrop of the above unshaken evidence adduced by the prosecution, it may be noted that the defence, too, as indicated above, has adduced evidence. The evidence, given by the defence, is to the effect that on both sides of the road, there were boulders lying and, while returning home with sugarcane leaves, the said deceased stumbled and fell on the boulders, which were lying for the construction of the road, and as a result of the fall, which the deceased so had on the boulders, he sustained injuries on his stomach, alarm was raised and the injured was taken to the Police Station and, then, to the hospital, where he died. It is the further evidence given by the defence that on the advice of Laxmi Ravidas and Jagdish Ravidas, the accused were falsely implicated.
18. What is, however, crucial to note, while considering the evidence adduced by the defence, is that at the time, when the prosecution witnesses were being cross-examined by the defence, it was not even suggested to them that the said deceased sustained injuries on not being stabbed by means of knife or dagger by accused Umesh Ravidas, but because of fall on the boulders.
19. Thus, no foundation for the story, which has been subsequently projected by the defence, was laid, while cross-examining the witnesses of the prosecution, particularly, PW 1 and PW 2. The defence taken by the accused-appellant cannot but be regarded, in the absence of anything shown to the contrary, as a version of the occurrence given as a measure of afterthought.
20. In the light of what has been discussed above, the possibility of the accused having introduced, as an afterthough, that Ram Briksh Ravidas had sustained injury by falling on the boulders, cannot be wholly excluded, particularly, when the doctors, who had treated Ram Briksh Ravidas at Amas hospital and, later on, at Gaya hospital, have not been examined.
21. As regards the enmity, which, admittedly, existed between the deceased and accused Umesh Ravidas, suffice it to point out, in this regard, that if there was enmity between the two, this enmity was a double-edged weapon. While enmity may be the cause for falsely implicating an accused either alone or in association with others, enmity may also become the cause of causing hurt and, in the case of present nature, this animosity, which existed between the deceased and the accused, cannot be ignored inasmuch as the accused-appellant had the reason to injure and kill Ram Briksh Ravidas in order to take share of the property, in question.
22. However, in order to determine the truth or falsity of the prosecutions case, it was incumbent, on the part of the learned trial Court, to examine the doctors and the Investigating Officer, because the doctors could have given the finding as to what injury or injuries had been found on the said deceased and whether the injury or injuries, which had been found on the said deceased, could have been caused by fall on the boulders or could have been caused by knife or dagger alone.
23. In terms of the impugned judgment and the relevant record of the case, the doctors have not been examined and the learned trial Court has observed in the impugned judgment that it (learned trial Court) has taken all efforts to secure the presence of the doctor and the Investigating Officer in the Court. We fail to understand as to why the presence of the official witnesses, namely, the doctors and the Investigating Officer, could not be procured by the learned trial Court and why the said witnesses could not be examined by the Court.
24. With regard to the above, it needs to be noted that the manner in which the prosecution has been conducted and the manner in which the learned trial Court has dealt with the case are wholly unsatisfactory. In a case as serious as the present one, it was the duty of the prosecution to bring on record every material fact so that the learned trial Court could have reached a finding based on consideration of all the relevant facts.
25. Coupled with the above, the learned trial Court, to our dismay, appears to have been merely recording the evidence without being aware of the duty, which a trial Judge is required to discharge, and the role, which a trial Judge is required to perform, inasmuch as the learned trial Judge has not, in the present case, exercised its powers under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates the Courts to call or recall or examine a witness, if the witnesss evidence appears to the Court essential to just decision of the case.
26. Bearing in mind the above aspects of the present appeal, we, now, turn to the scope of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, its aims and objectives. For the purpose of a clear understanding of what Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure aims at conveying, appropriate it is that the provisions, embodied in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are carefully taken note of. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow :-
œ311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.?
27. A patient reading of the Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly shows that this Section is divided into two parts. While the word, used in the first part, is, œmay?, the word used, in the second part, is, œshall?, It would, therefore, logically follow that the first part of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is permissive in nature and gives a discretion to a criminal Court to act, at any stage, of enquiry, trial or other proceeding, in one of the three ways, namely, (1) to summon any person as a witness, or (2) to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or (3) to recall and re-examine any person already examined.
28. The second part of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, however, mandatory in nature and casts an obligation on the court (i) to summon and examine or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.
29. The language, employed in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, clearly shows that this Section is couched in widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any manner. However, the wider the power, more cautious shall be the exercise thereof. No exercise of power, in a judicial proceeding, can be arbitrary and, more so, the power to call or recall a witness.
30. Whereas the first part of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as already indicated above, gives a discretion to the Court to call, recall and re-examine any person as a witness, the second part of this Section does not really give any discretion to the Court; rather, it clarifies that if a Court forms the view, in the facts of a given case, that the evidence of the person, who is sought to be called, recalled or re-examined, is essential to the just decision of the case, it would be mandatory for the Court to call, re-call or re-examine such a person as a witness. This mandatory exercise of power can also be undertaken to obtain fresh evidence provided that the Court forms a view, as indicated hereinbefore, that bringing of such fresh evidence on record is essential to the just decision of the case.
31. Though the law requires the parties to produce, before the court, the best available evidence, the fact remains that even in a criminal trial, prosecution as well as defence has the right to choose their witness or witnesses and also choose as to what evidence they would adduce. Nonetheless, they are bound to adduce the best available evidence. The Court has no power to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness. This embargo placed on the powers of the Court, i.e., the limitation of not directing either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness as their witness, is sought to be balanced by the Legislature with the help of the provisions contained in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as the Legislature has, with the help of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowered the criminal court to call, recall or re-examine any person as witness. The only rider, which Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure attaches to the exercise of this power, is that a criminal court cannot call, recall or re-examine any person as witness unless examination of such a person is, in the opinion of the Court, essential to a just decision of the case. If, however, the court is of the view that evidence of a particular witness is necessary for reaching a just decision of the case, the court, either on its own or on the application of any of the parties concerned, call, recall or re-examine any witness as long as it does not cause prejudice to any of the parties concerned or does not give an undue advantage to any of such parties.
32. The kind of power, which Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests in a Court, is not peculiar to the criminal law inasmuch as similar provisions have been made even in respect of civil courts in the form of Order X, Rule 2, Order X, Rule 14 and Order XVIII, Rule 17.
33. Even Section 165 of the Evidence Act recognizes courts power to put any questions to any witness, at any time, which appears to the Judge as necessary for just decision of the case or in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts.
34. We may pause here to point put that a trial Judge is not merely a recording machine of evidence given by the witnesses nor can he be a silent spectator to the evidence produced by the parties. Though a trial Judge must not drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the role of a prosecutor or a defence counsel, the fact remains that his duty is to reach the truth and Section 165 of the Evidence Act gives the Judge adequate power and authority to put any question to any witness at any time • be it during the course of examination-in-chief or cross-examination or at the end of any such examination or re-examination, which, to the Judge, appears to be necessary to a just decision of the case and in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant fact.
35. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal and such evidence becomes clear, complete and intelligible. A Judge, who, while presiding over a trial, merely records evidence without caring to conduct examination of the witnesses in order to ensure that evidence on record becomes intelligible, must be held to have not performed his duty as warranted by law. A Judge is not merely an observer. It is his duty to explore, within permissible limits, the truth.
36. If, therefore, a Judge finds that the examination of a witness is not being conducted in such a way as to unfold complete truth, it is not only right for the Judge, but his duty it is to intervene and put such questions as may be warranted and permissible within the ambit of Section 165 of the Evidence Act.
37. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to question the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials.
38. A case cannot be allowed to suffer for failure of any of the parties to elicit relevant materials from a witness. It is to discover the truth and bring, on record, the relevant facts that a Judge has been vested with the power to put questions under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. It is with this object in view that the Judge has been vested with the power to call any witness or recall any witness at any time suo motu or at the instance of any of the parties if it becomes necessary to a just decision of the case.
39. If the prosecution omits to bring out any relevant fact or the defence elicits from a witness, in the cross-examination, a statement, which is obscure or incomplete, the defence does not acquire (the Judge must bear in mind) a vested right in such limited cross-examination. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question.
40. In fact, emphasizing what role a Judge should play in a trial, the Supreme Court, in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble [MANU/SC/ 0677/2003 : (2003) 7 SCC 749], observed:
œ34. The courts exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected. The trial/first appellate courts cannot get swayed by abstract technicalities and close their eyes to factors which need to be positively probed and noticed. The court is not merely to act as a tape recorder recording evidence, overlooking the object of trial, i.e., to get at the truth, and oblivious to the active role to be played for which there is not only ample scope but sufficient powers conferred under the Code. It has a greater duty and responsibility, i.e., to render justice in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is put in issue.?
(Emphasis is supplied)
41. From the position of law laid down, in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (supra), it becomes transparent that a Court is not a tape-recorder, which has to merely record evidence. Far from this, when the Courts object is to do justice, it cannot overlook the necessity to reach the truth. Hence, while a Court cannot assume the role of a party to a case, it nevertheless has the duty to remove vagueness or obscurity from a witnesss evidence so that the evidence becomes intelligible to a Court of law.
42. No wonder, therefore, that the Supreme Court, in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra [MANU/SC/0063/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 178], observed that these two sections, (i.e., Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 165 of the Evidence Act) confer jurisdiction on the judge to act in aid of justice. Dealing With the corresponding section in the old Code (Section 540) Hidayatuliah, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani (supra), observed as follows:
œIt would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction, statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness or examine one present in court or to recall a witness already examined, and makes this the duty and obligation of the court provided the just decision of the case demands it. In other words, where the court exercises the power under the second part, the enquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new Evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case.?
43. The observations, made by O. Chinappa Reddy, J. in Ram Chander v. State of Haryana [MANU/SC/ 0206/1981 : AIR 1981 SC 1036] are also to the same effect as the observations in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani (supra).
44. However, as already pointed out earlier, the wider the power, more cautious has to be its exercise. The power, under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot, therefore, be uncanalised, uncontrolled or arbitrary. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is neither limited by any particular stage of a criminal proceeding nor is it conditioned by any specific circumstance. The principle, underlying Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is that the evidence, to be obtained, shall appear to the court essential to a just decision of the case.
45. It is for the reason, as indicated above, that in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India [MANU/SC/0318/1991 : (1991) Supp (1) SCC 271], the Supreme Court has held that the aid of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be invoked only with the object of discovering relevant facts or obtaining proof of relevant facts in order to render a just decision in a given case.
46. It is incumbent, on the part of the court, to take care to ensure that while exercising its powers under Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not allow a lacuna, left by the prosecution or by the defence, to be fulfilled nor shall the exercise of power put the accused to disadvantage or cause prejudice to him or give an unfair advantage to the prosecution. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can also not be utilized in such a way that it changes the nature of the case of either of the parties.
47. Failure of proper and effective management of a case by counsel cannot be treated as a lacuna of a partys case. In other words, a lapse, in the management of a case, is not to be regarded as a lacuna of a partys case. An oversight, in the management of the prosecutions case, is not a lacuna. It is not the duty of the trial Court to count errors committed by the parties in conducting their cases or to find out and declare as to who, among the parties concerned, performed better. A lacuna, in a complainants or prosecutions case, would mean an inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the complainants or prosecutions case. Explaining as to what can be regarded as a lacuna in a prosecutions case, the Supreme Court, in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell [MANU/SC/ 0397/1999 : (1999) 6 SCC 110], observed:
œ7. It is a common experience in criminal courts that defence counsel would raise objections whenever courts exercise powers under Section 311 of the Code or under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by saying that the court could not œfill the lacuna in the prosecution case.? A lacuna in the prosecution is not to be equated with the fallout of an oversight committed by a Public Prosecutor during trial, either in producing relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from witnesses. The adage œto err is human? is the recognition of the possibility of making mistakes to which humans are prone. A corollary of any such laches or mistakes during the conducting of a ease cannot be understood as a lacuna which a court cannot fill up.
8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better?.
(Emphasis is added)
48. Hence, when a defect arises, or crepts in, due to faulty management of the case by a partys Counsel or due to oversight or unmindfulness of a counsel, such a defect cannot, and shall not, be treated as a lacuna inherent in the case of the prosecution or the complainant.
49. Coupled with the above, the law provides enough power to the Courts to pursue entire Chapter-X of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with this aspect, by making it an offence not to execute summon or warrant for production of any accused or witness. Chapter-X also embodies penal provisions in order to ensure that if a person, on receiving summons or warrant, omits to appear in the Court • be such person an accused or a witness • he becomes liable for prosecution.
50. In the present case, learned trial Court appears to have not initiated proceedings for prosecution of the police officer, who was given the responsibility to execute the processes, and since the processes have not been proved to have been served or executed by the police officer concerned, presence of the doctors and the Investigating Officer could not be obtained. The manner in which the trial has been conducted by the learned trial Court, so far as obtaining of the presence of the witnesses is concerned, one cannot, but hold and observe that there is glaringly noticeable lapse and failure to exercise power lawfully vested in the Court.
51. If the conviction of the accused-appellant is maintained on the ground that the evidence adduced by the prosecution has remained unshaken, it may cause serious prejudice to the accused in the absence of examination of the material witnesses, namely, the doctors and the Investigating Officer. At the same time, if the accused-appellant is acquitted merely, because of the omission of the learned trial Court to discharge the duties, which it had in law, there would be serious miscarriage of justice.
52. The remedy, therefore, lies in setting aside the impugned conviction of the accused-appellant and also the sentence, which has been passed consequence thereto, and, then, remand the case to the learned trial Court to obtain the presence of the doctors and the Investigating Officer concerned, as witnesses, examine them in accordance with law and, then, decide the case in the light of the evidence, which may be surface on record, so that the ends of justice are satisfied.
53. Though the medical evidence is not binding upon the Court, it is important to bear in mind, in the facts and attending circumstances of the presence case, that the nature of injury or injuries, sustained by the said deceased, is required to be known by the Court so that it can be determined as to whether the injury or injuries, which had been sustained by the said deceased, could have been caused by fall on the boulders.
54. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the impugned conviction of the appellant by the judgment, under appeal, as well as the impugned order of sentence are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court for disposing of the same in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made by this Court in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment.
55. In order to avoid delay in the conduct of the trial, the learned trial Court shall not, unless it becomes wholly imperative, recall any witness merely for further cross-examination.
56. Coming to the question as to whether the appellant shall, on account of the fact that his conviction has been set aside, be set at liberty, we cannot ignore the fact that the important witnesses, namely, the doctor and the Investigating Officer, have not turned up to depose during the trial.
57. In the circumstances indicated above, it would be appropriate to keep, in custody, the accused-appellant, whose conviction and the consequential sentence have been set aside, until the time his trial is concluded and judgment is pronounced. The release of the accused-appellant shall, therefore, be governed by the outcome of the trial, which shall be held, on remand, in terms of the directions given above and until the time the trial is concluded, the accused-appellant shall be detained in custody unless, otherwise, directed by this Court.
58. The learned trial Court is also directed to expeditiously deal with the case and dispose of the same in accordance with law, preferably, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the Lower Court Records along with a copy of this judgment and order.
59. In terms of the above observations and directions, this appeal shall stand disposed of.
60. The Registry shall send back the Lower Court Records along with a copy of this judgment and order.