Reported in : AIR1924Mad602; (1924)46MLJ463
venkatasubba rao, j.1. the learned subordinate judge granted the application for review either on the ground that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record or on the ground that there was ' other sufficient reason ' under order 47, r. i. an appeal against an order granting review may be challenged only on one of the grounds specified in order 47, rule 7. no such grounds exist in the present case and can be urged in this appeal. then the question arises as this is a final appeal from the decree itself, can the decision be challenged on grounds other than those contained in rule 7? if the grounds relate to the granting of the review, in my opinion, the grounds, must be those that are set out in rule 7. [see baroda churn ghose v. govinda proshad tewary ilr (1895) cal. 984 bubiram chowdhury v. bishea perkash naran singh ilr (1897) c 878 and gopala iyer v. ramasami sastrial ilr (1907) m 49 : 1907 17 mlj 603.] this will not of course preclude the appellant from arguing the second appeal on its merits. it has not been shown that the decision on the merits is wrong. in the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Mad682; (1924)46MLJ590
.....minus all the debts would have been much less than what he actually got viz., an annuity of rs. 360 and we come to this conclusion in spite of the fact that there has been no division by metes and bounds and the decision in appa v. ranga ilr (1882) mad 71 is doubtful, if it meant to decide that the family continues joint in cases where there is a relinquishment by the father subject to a maintenance. it is not bona fide only in the sense, that provision was not made for all the debts of 1st defendant not illegal and immoral (ghose's hindu law vol. 1 page 438) out of the whole joint family properties from which they would have been recoverable if there had been no partition and debts like the plaintiffs will be defeated if it is held that the defendants 2 to 5 are not liable. as it is doubtful whether the exception mentioned in the cases uses the expression ' bona fide ' in this sense, we had to consider the question of the correctness of the decisions relied on.4. it may be that, under the primitive hindu law, a son is under a pious duty to discharge his father's debts irrespective of the devolution, on him, of any kind of property. but the decisions have established the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1925Mad125
.....relied on by the learned vakil for the appellant, in support of the agreement, is that the pro-petty was enjoyed by the father alone.6. but when the facts are examined, this statement really has no significance. the father and son were joint, up to 1912, and during their jointness naturally it was the father that managed the property. disputes arose between the father and the son and they became divided in status hi that year and in 1914 the father conveyed the property to his wife, under the sale-deed ex. vii.7. so all that is left to us to form a material for inferring any agreement, at the date of adoption, is merely one year's enjoyment. this contention of the appellant must, therefore, be disallowed.8. the second point argued by the appellant is that the sale-deed, ex. vii, is binding on the 2nd defendant. we do not see how this contention can be supported. it is a sale-deed by the father after the separation in status between him and his son and apart from any question of considerations it cannot bind the son to the extent of the son's share.9. the third point argued for the appellant is that the property is not joint family property in the hands of venkataratnam, in the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : (1924)ILR47Mad621
.....minus all the debts would have been much less than what he actually got, viz., an annuity of rs. 360 and we come to this conclusion in spite of the fact that there has been no division by metes and bounds and the decision in appa v. ranga i.l.r. (1883) mad. 71 is doubtful, if it meant to decide that the family continues joint in cases where there is a relinquishment by the father subject to a maintenance. it is not bona fide only in the sense that provision was not made for all the debts of first defendant, not illegal and immoral (ghose's hindu law, vol. 1, page 438) out of the whole joint family properties from which they would have been recoverable if there had been no partition and debts like the plaintiff's will be defeated if it is held that the defendants 2 to 5 are not liable. as it is doubtful whether the exception mentioned in the cases uses the expression 'bona fide' in this sense, we had to consider the question of the correctness of the decisions relied on.4. it may be that, under the primitive hindu law, a son is under a pious duty to discharge his father's debts irrespective of the devolution, on him, of any kind of property. but the decisions have established the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 80Ind.Cas.79
.....relied on by the learned vakil for the appellant in support of the agreement is that the property was enjoyed by the father alone. but when the facts are examined, this statement really has no significance. the father and son were joint up to 1912 and during their jointness naturally it was the father that managed the property. disputes arose between the father and the son and they became divided in status in that year and in 1914 the father conveyed the property to his wife under the sale-deed ex. vii. so all that is left to us to form a material for inferring any agreement at the date of adoption is merely one year's enjoyment. this contention of the appellant must, therefore, be disallowed.3. the second point argued by the appellant is that the sale-deed, ex. vii, is binding on the 2nd defendant. we do not see how this contention' can be supported. it is a sale-deed by the father after the separation in status between him and his son, and apart from any question of consideration it cannot bind the son to the extent of the son's share.4. the third point argued for the appellant is that the property is not joint family property in the hands of venkataratnam in the sense.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 83Ind.Cas.548
venkatasubba rao, j.1. the learned subordinate judge granted the application for review either on the ground that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record or on the ground that there was 'other sufficient reason' under order xlvii, rule 1. an appeal against an order grantingreviewmay be challenged only on one of the grounds specified in order xlvii, rule 7. no such grounds exist in the present case and can be urged in this appeal. then the question arises, as this is a final appeal from the decree itself, can the decision be challenged on grounds other than those. contained in rule 7? if the grounds relate to the granting of the review, in my opinion, the grounds must be those that are set out in rule 7 [see baroda churn ghose v. gobind proshad tewary 22 c.p 984 : 11 ind. dec. (n.s.) 653 munni ram chowdhry v. bishen perkash narain singh 24 c.p 878 : 12 ind. dec. (n.s.) 1254 and gopala aiyar v. ramasami sastrial 31 m.p 49 : 17 m.l.j. 603 : 2 m.l.t. 519 this will not preclude the appellants from arguing the second appeal on its merits. it has not been shown that the decision on the merits is wrong. in the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Cal751,84Ind.Cas.372
.....is challenged on the ground that, it was passed in the illegal exercise of jurisdiction. we are of opinion that this order cannot be sustained.2. order 23, rule (1) invests the court with power to allow the plaintiff to withdraw a suit on certain conditions, namely, where the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there are other grounds for allowing the prayer to withdraw. in this case the learned judge has not assigned any reason why he thinks that the plaintiff should be allowed to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. this power has been conferred upon the court to be exercised on certain conditions. the learned judge has not mentioned there was any necessity for allowing the plaintiff to withdraw the suit and apparently he had no jurisdiction to pass an order under that provision of the law. it is more incumbent upon an appellate court in giving permission to the plaintiff to withdraw a suit which has been fought strenuously in the court below to record its reasons. there is evident authority for our power under section 115 to interfere with an order like this. it will be enough to cite only one case, viz., the case of bajendra lal v......
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Cal827,(1924)ILR51Cal663,79Ind.Cas.326
.....that decision a new act has been passed and that the terms of section 4 are wide enough to justify the procedure followed in this case. i do not think that this argument is correct because the words 'subject to the provisions of this act' appear in that section and as under the act the property of the insolvent vests in the receiver, the provisions of section 4 cannot be taken to authorize a creditor to prosecute an enquiry of this kind.4. it is true that in substance the result may be much the same, whether the creditor carries on the enquiry in person or uses the receiver as a figure head, but that is not a sufficient reason for countenancing a procedure not warranted by law, particularly where, as in this case, the objection was taken, though perhaps rather obscurely in the lower court.5. i think that the appeal should be allowed and the order annulling the conveyance set aside, with costs: the hearing fee in this court being assessed at two gold mohurs. we express no opinion on the merits and this order will not prevent the receiver taking action if thought advisable.mukerji, j.6. i agree.
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Bom339; (1924)26BOMLR237
.....second by the respondents in the circumstances mentioned by the learned judge at pp. 336 to 340 of the paper book. there being no dispute as to the facts there is no necessity for me to set them out again in this judgment. the learned judge on the second petition ordered that messrs. chandabhoy and guzdar should be removed from their office as liquidators in the voluntary winding up of the tata industrial bank. as a consequence of that order the first petition was dismissed with costs, the judge remarking that in the circumstances of the case he thought the presentation of that petition was improper.2. under section 207, clause (ix), of the indian companies act the court has power in the voluntary winding up of a company on cause shown to remove a liquidator. what should be the measure of 'due cause' was considered in in re adam eyton; ex parte charlesworth (19887) 36 ch. d. 299. where bowen l.j. said (p. 306):a contention was raised by mr. cozens-hardy . . . to the effect that untitness in the liquidator ought to bo shewn before he is removed...in many cases, no doubt, and very likely, for anything i know in most cases, unfitness of the liquidator will be the general form which.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Bom417; (1924)26BOMLR341
.....section 15 d of the dekkhan agriculturists' relief act could not lie. accordingly he dismissed the plaintiff's suit.2. on a consideration of these facts it would be strange if a purchaser from the heirs of kusaji in 1914 could now file a suit for an account of the mortgage of 1868 on the ground that his brother having sold the equity of redemption in the same year without his consent he was entitled to disregard that sale and plead that his share never passed at all. kusaji would have had a right to dispute the alienation as soon as it came to his know-. ledge, and his suit challenging the alienation would be barred after twelve years from the date of his knowledge. we have to presume for the purpose of the appellant's argument that kusaji had no knowledge of the alienation and i see no reason why at this distance of time we should make that presumption. apart from that, the ancestors of defendants nos.1 and 2 having purchased from the mortgagee the whole property and not merely the mortgagee's rights, clearly article 134 of the indian limitation act would apply and the purchaser would be entitled to retain the property if no suit was brought to set aside the sale within twelve.....
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