Reported in : (1924)47MLJ370
.....legal representative without determining the question on its merits after notice had gone to ruckmani ammal as she had raised the question. the mere fact that ruckmani ammai was discovered to be a minor was no reason for not considering her plea that she was the rightful representative. here the analogy to be applied is that under order 32, rule 3. the respondents do not attempt to justify the action of the court which indeed is quite opposed to the ordinary duties of a court in regard to minors, so much as to show that the petitioner has no right to move this court for revision. they contend that her remedy was by way of appeal against the order, or at any rate by way of suit after reaching her majority, and in any case her application for review has been unduly delayed.3. there is no statutory right of appeal against an order under order 32, rule 3. ' the legislature has chosen not to give a right of appeal against orders under that rule. ' lakshmi achi v. subbarama aiyar : air1916mad528 but respondents rely upon ayya mudali velan v. veerayee : (1920)39mlj218 where it is held that an order rejecting the claim of a person to be the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff is.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Mad867; (1925)ILR68Mad781; 82Ind.Cas.942
.....is whether defendants 1 and 2 have any claim to succeed to the office, and whether plaintiff as lessee can recover the emoluments of the office. section 21, act iii of 1895, would seem therefore to apply. but it has long been settled that section 21 must be read with section 18. in spite of the generality of the language of section 21 the jurisdiction of the civil court is taken away only in those cases in which it is conferred on the revenue court by section 13 : muvvula seetham naidu v. doddi ram naidu i.l.r., (1910) mad., 208. under section 13 any person may sue before the collector for a village office or for its emoluments on the ground that he is entitled to hold such office and enjoy such emoluments. the section is clearly confined to persons suing in their own right as holders. on behalf of respondents it is urged that if this be so a holder has only to lease the emoluments and leave it to the lessee to sue on his title in order to carry the suit away from the jurisdiction of the revenue courts. the short answer is that he can do this if he so pleases. the question of jurisdiction is merely technical and involves no equities. if a holder wants to sue, the legislature.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 83Ind.Cas.23
.....of the will in this case is somewhat different from that of the will in that case. for example the clause referring to the daughter's son in the other case ran thus: 'if a male is born to my daughter, it will inherit the real property given to my wife and daughter'. in this case it runs thus: 'after these, their issues shall use and enjoy them'. there are other differences. the will before us is more consistent with the view that the testator intended that the daughter's son should get an estate only if he survived the daughter; in other words, that the son should survive the mother is a condition precedent to any estate vesting in him. if that is so, the son having predeceased the mother, no estate vested in him and nothing descended to his father. on this construction of the will, the farther question argued by mr. radhakrishnayya as to the retrospective operation of act viii of 1921 does not arise.3. in the result, the appeal will be allowed and the plaintiff and the second defendant will get a decree with mesne profits at rs. 21 a month from the date of this decree and costs in both courts from the estate of the first respondent.coutts-trotter, c.j.4. i agree.
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 80Ind.Cas.942
.....as legal representative without determining the question on its merits after notice had gone to rukmani and she had raised the question. the mere fact that rukmani was discovered to be a minor was no reason for not considering her plea that she was the rightful representative. here the analogy to be applied is that under order xxxii, rule 3. the respondents do not attempt to justify the action of the court which indeed is quite opposed to the oridinary duties of a court in regard to minors, so much as to show that the petitioner has no right to move this court for revision. they contend that her remedy was by way of appeal against the order, or at any rate by way of suit after reaching her majority, and in any case her application has been unduly delayed.3. there is no statutory right of appeal against an order under order xxii, rule 3. the legislature has chosen not to give a right of appeal against orders under that rule. lakshmi achi v. subrama aiyar 29 ind. cas. 142 : 28 m.l.j. 491 : (1915) m.w.n. 327 : 17 m.l.t. 385. but respondents rely upon ayya mudali velan v. veerayee 58 ind. cas. 498 : (1920) m.w.n. 467 where it is held that an order rejecting the claim of a person.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1924Cal796
.....within the meaning of section 19 of the arbitration act. in this judgment i will deal with the application under the arbitration act.2. the facts are as follows : - by an agreement made in writing and dated the 1st april, 1917, between the maharajah on the one part and h.v. low and j.h. pattinson on the other part, it was provided that subject to the fulfilment of the terms and conditions therein contained and on the part of the firm of h.v. low & co. ltd., (of which low and pattinson were the partners) to be observed and performed, the said firm were appointed managing agents of the maharajah's collieries for a period of 20 years and the said firm during the continuance of the said agreement were to have the sole, absolute and unfettered control of the management and working of the said collieries. the said firm during the continuance of the said agreement were to use their best endeavours to raise the largest possible amount of coal from the said collieries and to sell the same at the best available prices. the said firm were to be entitled to retain and be paid all working expenses, exclusive of freight payable in respect of the coal to be sold by the said firm. they.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1925Cal482
.....between the plaintiffs and the defendant no. 5 who have conflicting claims thereto and, therefore, this objection of the respondents must fail. in fact, the position is much stronger here than it was in the case of mahommad gauhar ali v. samiruddin sheikh (1913) 18 c.w.n. 33 in which the tenant-defendant pleaded that; the lease granted by the alleged superior landlord in favour of the plaintiff therein was invalid, and the said superior landlord, though a party to the suit, did not contest it. the respondents further contend that in a simple suit for rent complicated questions of title should not have been gone into and their object in making the defendant no. 5 a party was not to get such questions decided, but only to frame the suit as one in conformity with the provisions of section 148-a of the bengal tenancy act, and in support of this contention reliance has been placed upon the case of lodai mollah v. kally dass roy (1882) 8 cal. 238. my only answer to this contention is that it was very unfortunate and i quite sympathise with the respondents; but when this conflicting claim of title was set up it was bound to be decided and has been so decided and it is too late now to.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1925Cal547
.....was duly advertised. it transpired in the course of the suit that three of the said plaintiffs had neither verified nor signed the plaint and, in fact, one of them deposed as a witness on behalf of the defence. the learned munsif relied upon this, amongst other grounds, for dismissing the suit. the learned subordinate judge ordered the names of the said three persons to be struck out from the plaint, and decreed the suit in favour of the remaining twelve persons as i have stated above.4. the objection of the appellants in the above circumstances of the case is two-fold. it is urged first that the notice of action that was advertised was not a proper or sufficient one, and secondly that when the permission was given to the fifteen persons collectively, twelve of them, without fresh and express permission, were riot competent to go on with the suit.5. with regard to the objection as to notice the respondents contend that its validity was never challenged in the court below, that all that was objected to in the written statement was as to the proper service thereof and upon that point the court of first instance recorded a finding in its judgment in these words: 'there is.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1925Cal761,85Ind.Cas.636
.....to both the jamas and they are these:4th.-that the onus of proving the character of the jamas has been misplaced on the defendant.5th.-that the facts found go to show that there was recognition of the tenancy of the defendant no. 1 and the learned subordinate judge was in error in holding, otherwise.5. i propose to deal with the bigger jama first. the facts found by the learned subordinate judge are that this jama was described in the documents as consisting of 'bagat' land, that trees and vegetables were planted on it, that it was not a part of, nor did it constitute, one tenancy along with the homestead of the defendant no. 1's predecessor which lay close by, and that nobody ever lived on it. upon these findings the learned subordinate judge came to the conclusion that the tenancy, the origin of which was unknown, must be held, having regard to the surrounding circumstances and the nature of its enjoyment, to have been for horticultural purposes. it is not possible for this court upon these findings to come to a different conclusion. this ground, therefore, must fail. the second ground, based upon the assumption that the first one is well founded, also fails with it and it.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1925Cal993,85Ind.Cas.540
.....the court of first instance answered in the affirmative. this finding was based on the following.-1. the direct evidence of adoption; 2. the fact that the defendant no. 3 left his father's house and came to live with bhadoi and lived with the latter till his death; 3. the fact that the defendant no. 3 lived with bhadoi and then with defendant no. 1 till the latter separated from him about a year after bhadoi's death and that the defendant no. 3 was still living in bhadoi's house; 4. the fact that the defendant no. 3 possessed bhadoi's land, though he had some paternal land which was in the occupation of his nephews; and 5. the fact that the explanation offered by the defendant no. 3 occupied bhadoi's land as his ploughman was false. the lower appellate court observed in its judgment: 'my finding, therefore, is that there was no adoption at all.' i have been asked to treat this finding as a finding of fact. i regret i am unable to do so. the grounds upon which this ultimate finding is based in the words of that judgment are these :-1. ' the evidence is meagre and even if there was an adoption it was not valid. it was said that the defendant no. 3 was given in adoption by.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 83Ind.Cas.934
.....within the meaning of section 19 of the arbitration act. in this judgment i will deal with the application under the arbitration act.2. the facts are as follows: by an agreement made in writing and dated the 1st april 1917, between the maharajah on the one part and h.v. low and j. h. pattinson on the other part it was provided that subject to the fulfilment of the terms and conditions therein contained and on the part of the firm of h.v. low & co, ltd., (of which low and pattinson were the partners) to be observed and performed, the said firm were appointed managing agents of the maharajah's collieries for a period of 20 years and the said firm during the continuance of the said agreement were to have the sole absolute and unfettered control of the management and working of the said collieries. the said firm, during the continuance of the said agreement, were to use their best endeavours to raise the largest possible amount of coal from the said collieries and to sell the same at the best available prices. the said firm were to be entitled to retain and be paid all working expenses, exclusive of freight payable in respect of the coal to be sold by the said firm they were.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPT