Reported in : AIR1937Bom465; (1937)39BOMLR851
.....that case was made under the inam act of 1852, and i have no doubt that the resumption in the second case was also made under that act, although the fact is not expressly mentioned in the report.8. in considering the meaning of clause (6) of schedule b, one has also to notice the provisions of clause (11) which provides that-any of these rules may be relaxed in favour of claimants under instructions from the governor of bombay in council, in whom shall be vested the power of interpreting the precise meaning of any of the rules respecting which a question, may arise.there cannot, in my opinion, be the slightest doubt that government have construed those rules as entitling them only to resumption of possession of the privilege claimed by the inamdar, and not of possession of the soil. that is clear from the government resolution of 1854 referred to in vishnu trimbak v. tatia pant and from a note annexed to a report from, colonel etheridge, inam commissioner, to the chief secretary to government, dated april 21, 1873. the note is to paragraph 8 of that report and says that 'the governor in council does not conceive it probable that any of the local officers can so misread either act.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937Mad604; (1937)1MLJ640
.....section 15 of the indian arbitration act, which provides that an award shall be enforceable as if it were a decree of court, viscount cave observed thus:section 15 does not enact that an award when filed is to be deemed a decree of the court but only that it is to be enforceable as if it were a decree.2. sassoon & co. v. ramdutt ramkissen dass (1922) 44 m.l.j. 758 : l.r. 49 indap 49 : i.l.r. 50 cal. 1 at 9 (p.c.) and refused to apply the bar of section 47, civil procedure code, to a suit to-have an award declared null and void.3. thus applying, the said principle, from the co-operative societies act itself it is abundantly clear that the order of the liquidator under section 42(b) cannot be a decree for money within the meaning of section 7(iv-a), not having been passed by any court in a suit. a subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law and in case of reasonable doubt, a construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted. i am therefore of the opinion that section 7(iv-a) would not apply to the case and that the court-fee paid is proper. i accordingly set aside the order of the learned district judge and allow the revision petition.4. c.r.p......
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937Mad699; (1937)2MLJ209
.....came on for final hearing before madhavan nair and stodart, jj.]the judgment of the court was delivered bymadhavan nair, j.11. the essential facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal have been stated in our order of reference to the full bench. the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs who were the nearest reversioners to the estate of the last male holder at the time of the institution of the suit. but the question was raised by the second defendant, having regard to act ii of 1929, that she and her son were nearer reversioners than the plaintiffs and that the latter are therefore not entitled to maintain the suit. the full bench has now answered the question that in a case like the present the succession opens to the heirs of the last male owner after the passing of the act and is therefore governed by its provisions. it would follow from this decision that the second defendant and her son, that is, the sister and her son, are nearer reversioners to the estate of the late venkatakrishna aiyangar than the plaintiffs. it may be mentioned here that the son of the second defendant, who is a minor under her protection, is not a party to the suit.12. on the answer of the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1938Mad211; (1937)2MLJ903
.....of the district munsiff. the said notification runs thus:in exercise of the powers conferred by section 179 of the madras district municipalities act, rule 12 of the schedule to the madras local boards (amendment) act, 1930' (madras act x of 1930) (amendment) act, 1930 (madras act xi of 1930) governor acting with ministers is hereby pleased notwithstanding anything contained in the said act, to direct that chairman of municipal councils, presidents of panchayats shall have power and shall be deemed to have had power until 30th september, 1931, to levy profession tax on companies and persons in respect of the half years ending 31st march, 1931 and 30th september, 1931, respectively, without serving the notice required by sub-r. (1) of rule 19/11-a of schedule iv to the madras district municipalities act, 1920 (madras act v of 1920).madras local boards act (madras act xiv of 1920).3. this notification purports to have been issued under rule 12 of the transitional provisions of madras act xi of 1930. the said rule is to this effect:if any difficulty arises as to the first constitution or reconstitution of any local boards after the commencement of this act or otherwise in first.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937Mad769; 173Ind.Cas.244
.....though the sale is not binding on the subsequent mortgagee, who can in spite of it exercise his right of redemption . . . applying that rule to the facts of the present case, we have to accept the position that the mortgagor's rights were transferred to the defendant-respondents in 1886; but the plaintiff-appellants who were no party are entitled to redeem. in the exercise of their right of redemption, they are entitled to treat the prior mortgages as still subsisting. not being bound by the decree, they can ignore it. the necessary corollary to this is that account of the mortgage money is to be made up on the basis of the stipulation contained in the mortgage deed. in redeeming the mortgages, they must pay the principal and interest calculated up-to-date. at the same time the prior mortgagees who have been in possession of the mortgaged property by virtue of the auction-sale held in execution of their own mortgage decree should account for the usufruct received by them. they have to do this not because their possession can be traced to anything in the mortgages in their favour, which were simple, but to the fact that the usufruct received by them should be considered to be.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 169Ind.Cas.698
.....section 15 of the indian arbitration act which provides that an award shall be enforceable as it were a decree of court, viscount cave observed thus:section 15 does not enact that an award when filed is to be deemed a decree of the court but only that is to be enforceable as it were a decree.2. sassoon and co. v. ramdutt ramtossen das 50 c.i. : 70 ind. cas. 777 : a.i.r. 1922 p.c. 374 : 37 c.l.j. 336 : 44 m.l.j. 758 : 27 c.w.n. 660 : (1923) m.w.n. 372; 18 l.w. 537; 49 i.a. 366 and refused to apply the bar of section 47, civil procedure code, to a suit to have an award declared null and void.3. thus, applying the said principle, from the co-operative societies act, itself it is abundantly clear that the order of the liquidator under section 42 (b) cannot be a decree for money within the meaning of section 7 (iv-a), not having been passed by any court in a suit. a subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law and in case of reasonable doubt, a construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted. i am, therefore, of the opinion that section 7 (iv-a) would not apply to the case and that the court-fee paid is proper. i accordingly set aside the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937PC107
.....reason for that point, because, the period of limitation provided by art. 151 being 20 days for appealing against the order, a period of 124 days in fact elapsed before the appeal was taken. the contesting respondent's reply in excuse of his action was to say that, as provided by the terms of s. 12, sub.s. (2), lim. act, a portion of the 124 days, the deduction of which would leave less than 20 days, was accounted for by the period which elapsed before he could obtain a copy of the order against which he was going to appeal. the learned judges of the high court have held that the respondent has succeeded upon that, and they have so held on a detailed examination of what occurred during that period. their lordships agree with the conclusion at which the high court arrived. indeed, it occurs to them that it might be arguable that the first period of seven days, the period from 6th to 13th february, which is disallowed as against the respondent, was not to be so charged against the respondent, as in the first letter he asks the registrar to do something and the second letter is a reminder that he had asked him, although in form, it makes no reference to the previous letter. except.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : (1937)39BOMLR748
.....respect to the learned judges it is difficult to feel complete confidence in this method of approach. if on a disputed and complicated question of fact embarrassed by defect of materials and by not a little false swearing, the parties claiming partition do not make a particular type of case, it is not easy to see why the party resisting partition should be troubled with it, whether it be new or not. if it be disclaimed, the disclaimer itself is strong evidence on the other side. but if it be both new and disclaimed, can the party who has had no chance to meet it be told that the state of the evidence makes it useless to give him a chance? not, it would seem, unless the circumstances are highly exceptional and the conclusions exceptionally clear.7. their lordships will now set forth the main facts which they hold to be established as regards the history and transactions of the family. the pedigree prefixed to this judgment is not complete, nor are all the dates therein given precise, but it exhibits the main facts about the family of iswar das so far as they are necessary for the present case. raimoni = matak sana d.1908 | | chintamoni = iswar das | d. 1895.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937All423
.....are in revision against conviction under rule 12(1) for breach of rule 9(4) and against the sentence under rule 12(5) of the u.p. sugarcane rules, 1934. rule 9(4) lays down:no deduction shall be made from the weight of the case on the ground that the cane is improperly stripped or on any other ground whatever:provided that where cane is brought bound in bundles and weighed in bundles, a deduction not exceeding half a seer per full maund of cane may be made on account of the weight of the binding materials.2. this deduction of half a seer per maund is called 'karda'. the net weight of cane in these oases was (1) 11 maunds 20 seers; (2) 13 maunds 30 seers and (3) 13 maunds 30 seers. the applicant was entitled to a deduction of 5 1/2 seers from 11 maunds 20 seers and of 6 1/2 seers from 13 maunds 30 seers. the applicant was liable for payment for 11 maunds 14 1/2 seers in one case and for 13 maunds and 23 1/2 seers in the other two cases. the applicant actually paid to the sugarcane owner for 11 maunds 10 seers instead of 11 maunds 14 1/2 seers and for 13 maunds 20 seers in. stead of 13 maunds 23 1/2 seers in each of the two remaining cases. the applicant has been convicted.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1937All628
.....the suit should have been only rs. 111 and, therefore no appeal lay either to the district judge or to the high court. this argument is based on the fact that in the court-fees act, it is provided in section 7(xi)(cc) that in suits between land-lord and tenant for the recovery of immoveable property from a tenant, including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy, the amount of fees shall be computed according to the amount of the rent of the immoveable property to which the suit refers, payable for the years next before the date of presenting the plaint. the argument then proceeds that in the suits valuation act, section 8 provides:whereas in suits other than those referred to in the court-fees act, 1870, section 7, paras, v, vi and ix, and para. x, caluse (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the court-fees act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.2. learned counsel, therefore, argued that the valuation both for court-fee and for jurisdiction should be rs. 111 and, therefore that no appeal lay from the decree of the assistant collector refusing ejectment. now in.....
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