Reported in : AIR1943Mad416; (1943)1MLJ179
.....a full bench of the allahabad high court in shah abu ilyas v. ulfat bibi i.l.r.(1806) all. 50 that the '' change in circumstances ' referred to in section 489 of the code is a change in the pecuniary or other circumstances of the party paying or receiving the allowance which would justify an increase or decrease of the amount of the monthly payment originally fixed and not a change in the status of the parties which would entail a stoppage of the allowance. in that particular case the husband against whom enforcement of an order was sought had set up the divorce of his wife as a defence. the same view was expressed by a single judge of this court in the case of mohamed anser sahib v. zubeda bee (1933) m.w.n. 121 in which it was held that divorce was not a change in circumstances but a change in status. it follows, therefore, that the view of the learned magistrate that the petitioner's only remedy was by way of an application under section 489 of the criminal procedure code is erroneous. it was open to the petitioner to set up the marriage of his daughter as a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 488 (3) for failure to comply with the order in so far as she was.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad417; (1943)1MLJ235
.....no. 6 of 1940. the suit was filed for partition by the widow of the brother of the first defendant basing her rights to partition upon the newly enacted act xviii of 1937. before the suit came on for hearing, the federal court had decided in a case before them in 1941 that act xviii of 1937 was ultra vires of the central legislature in so far as it referred to agricultural land. the property of which the plaintiff sought partition consisted partly of agricultural land and partly of other property. when the decision of the federal court became known, she accordingly applied for permission to amend her plaint and claimed partition of such property as act xviii of 1937 was still effective to deal with, and maintenance in addition to that partition. this amendment was at first allowed, but the question whether this double remedy should be given was made the subject of an additional issue and the learned subordinate judge found that a decree could not be given for both maintenance and partition. he therefore called upon the plaintiff to elect which remedy she wished to have granted to her. against that order the present petition has been filed.2. it seems to me that the order of the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad352; (1943)1MLJ178
.....marked f and g either of which the labourers were entitled to take and that in order to go along the passage g, one has to go near e. the mere fact that there was a notice put up warning people against going near moving cranes is not, in our opinion, a prohibition, nor can it be said that the workmen were prohibited from going near e. ,4. in gane v. morton hill colliery co. (1909) 2 k.b. 539 a collier left his work, after coming up from the pit, by a route which crossed on the level ground some lines of rail belonging to and under the control of his employers. at the time the workman tried to cross there were some trucks standing on the line, and he tried to get under them as he was doing so the trucks moved, and he was seriously injured. the county court judge found on the facts that there were three ways by which the workman might have gone home, but the way he went by was the shortest, was always used by all the workmen who lived in the same direction as the applicant, and was so used with the knowledge and consent of the employers. it was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the applicant's employment within the meaning of the workmen's compensation.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad353; (1943)1MLJ260
.....that order. it is common ground that if the accident arose out of and in the course of employment the order of the commissioner must stand.2. the facts are very simple. the appellant employed the two workmen for loading manganese ore into skips at a dump within the harbour premises. the hours of work were from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. it was usual for the workmen to take refreshment in turns after they had worked for several hours. on the 21st october, 1940, the deceased workmen worked from 2 to 7-30 p.m. when they left the harbour premises in order to drink some coffee. they apparently did not ask for permission to go, but nothing turns on this, because, as we have mentioned, it was usual for the workmen to go away for short periods when convenient. the deceased workmen having partaken of coffee returned to the harbour premises to resume their work. they took a short cut which necessitated their crossing certain railway lines. while they were crossing these lines a railway engine ran into them and both were killed. there is a notice prohibiting persons from crossing the railway lines but the evidence of the foreman of the yard is that it was usual for workmen in the harbour premises.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad547; (1943)1MLJ427
.....of the defendants and accordingly dismissed the suit.2. in order to appreciate the contentions of the appellant, it is necessary to state a few facts. on the 7th march, 1933, the appellant filed a petition under order 33, rules 2 and 3 of the code of civil procedure for leave to institute a suit for the same reliefs as those for which the present suit has been instituted. this petition was ultimately dismissed on 3rd november, 1933, the petitioner being directed, to pay rs. 17 as costs to the contesting respondents who are defendants i and 2 here and re. 1 for the costs of the government. these costs were not paid until some time after the institution of the present suit in which the plaint was filed on 26th june, 1939. the plaint bore a court-fee of annas twelve only although the proper court-fee was rs. 337-7-0. the conduct of the plaintiff in paying a court-fee of annas twelve only can scarcely be regarded as bona fide, as it is impossible to imagine that he could have honestly thought that that was the court-fee. on the 27th june, 1939, the plaint was returned by the court with a direction that the deficit court-fee should be paid and time was granted for this purpose.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Bom407; (1943)45BOMLR791
.....court on appeal by the plaintiff accepted the situation as found by the trial court, but allowed the plaintiff to amend his plaint in spite of the fact that at the date of the amendment the claim for two years' salary earned up to january 6, 1937, was barred by time, the amendment having been asked for more than three years after january 6, 1937. the learned judge thought that this was a special case where justice required ah amendment of the plaint to be allowed so as to base the claim upon a different cause of action, namely the fact that the plaintiff had served for two years on an agreed salary of rs. 750 per year. there was no clear finding of fact that the plaintiff actually served for two years on an agreed salary of rs. 750 per year; but the learned judge evidently assumed that that was correct. there was also no issue or decision as to the fact of the plaintiff having worked for two years on an agreed salary of rs. 750 being in any way affected by jadavji's written undertaking to pay him rs. 1,500 when circumstances permitted, and there is nothing in the judgment of the learned judge to suggest that this last question was before his mind at all. the learned judge.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943All243
.....the person directed to pay the penalty may appeal. otherwise, there is no right of appeal, any direction made under either sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of section 15 being final. from the language of section 17 it appears that appeals are allowed when there has been a direction and save as provided in the first part of section 17 directions are final. the learned district judge held that, as in the present case the magistrate passed no direction having found that the application is time-barred, there was no provision in the act for an appeal. in section 15, clause (3) it is when an application has been entertained that the authority which deals with it hears both sides or gives them an opportunity of being heard and after further enquiry, if any, as may be necessary it may direct a refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of the delayed wages together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may deem fit. an order for the payment of compensation is also a direction, for, the section also states that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in certain eases. if the application is malicious or vexatious, the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad419; (1943)1MLJ233
.....expressly states that except as provided in it every decree or order of a village court shall be final. this section has been inserted in the act in order that a person aggrieved by the improper action of a village court may have a remedy but it is not a remedy by appeal. it is a remedy by a petition to the district munsiff who is empowered to deal with such a situation.4. section 77 of the act as amended by the madras village courts (amendment) act, 1936, states that the provisions of sections 403, 476, 476-a and 476-b, criminal procedure code, shall apply to a village court. section 476-a, criminal procedure code, reads thus:the power conferred on civil, revenue and criminal courts by section 476, sub-section (1), may be exercised, in respect of any offence referred to therein and alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any such court, by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3), in any case in which such former court has neither made a complaint under section 476 in respect of such offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint; and, where the superior court.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad585; (1943)1MLJ286
.....this appeal is against the learned judge's judgment under cl. 15 of the letters patent.2. the cases referred to by the learned judge can no longer be regarded as having application here. order 33, rule 11 has been amended since the decision in neelamma v. mareppa (1935) 70 m.l.j. 128 the latest of the decisions referred to in the judgment under appeal. the rule as it now stands directs that where the plaintiff in a pauper suit fails, the court shall direct him to pay the court-fee. the rule provides for one exception, namely, the case of a suit by the next friend of a minor plaintiff. if a suit filed by the next friend has been filed unreasonably or improperly, the court may order the next friend to pay personally the court-fee. as the rule reads now it is clearly not open to the court to order a defendant to pay the court-fee. it is to be remembered that this is not a question of an order for costs. the court's discretion in the matter of costs, other than the court-fee, is not hampered.3. the appeal will be allowed with costs throughout. in this court and before venkataramana rao, j., the costs will be payable by the government.
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : AIR1943Mad427; (1943)1MLJ249
.....for the plaintiff to seek to set aside the partition. but it is urged for the petitioner in this court that that decision has no application to the facts of this case as in this particular case the minor was represented by a guardian and the partition deed in question so far as the plaintiff is concerned was one executed by the guardian of the minor. and it is also stated that in cases where the document is executed by a father or manager of a joint hindu family, both in the capacity as manager and father and also as guardian of the minor, it would be open to the minor on attaining majority to ignore it and proceed as if it is not binding on him. but in cases where the person who executed the document did not act in his capacity either as manager or father but only as a guardian of a minor, it will be necessary for the minor to have the document set aside before he could recover possession of the properties.3. reliance was placed upon the decisions in venkatakrishnayya v. shaik ali sahib (1938) 48 l.w. 277 govindan-nair v. madhavi : air1932mad491 , alagar iyengar v. srinivasa iyengar (1925) 50 m.l.j. 406 achammal v. achammal : (1910)20mlj791 and the decision in chandu nair v......
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