Latest Cases

Jersey Central Power and Light Co. Vs. Fpc

Court : US Supreme Court

.....and staten island. since the bus bar into which the jersey central energy is fed also receives large amounts of energy from other sources, the facts heretofore detailed do not prove conclusively that energy generated by jersey central passes to and is consumed in new york. this further evidence page 319 u. s. 66 appears from testimony presented by investigators of the commission. their examination of public service records discloses that there were moments of time between january 26, 1937, and september 6, 1938, when all the energy flowing into the bus bar at mechanic street came from jersey central, and, at the same moments, energy flowed from mechanic street in new jersey to the atlantic substation in new york. as no pools of energy exist from which the flow to new york could have been drawn, it necessarily follows that jersey central production was instantaneously transmitted to new york. cf. utah power & light co. v. pfost, 286 u. s. 165 . the amount of energy transmitted was small. the evidence was developed from 184 log readings selected from 25,000. of the 184 log readings, 12 showed this flow of energy from jersey central to new york between.....

Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. Vs. Kelly

Court : US Supreme Court

.....foundation for the jurisdiction of the domiciliary state to tax. curry v. mccanless, supra. we recently applied that principle to sustain, on facts very close to the present ones, oregon's power to tax a transfer of intangibles held in illinois by one domiciled in oregon. pearson v. mcgraw, 308 u. s. 313 . and see van dyke v. tax commission, 235 wis. 128, 292 n.w. 313, aff'd, 311 u.s. 605. the execution of the present trust agreement in new york, the circumstance that the remaindermen as well as the trustee were nonresidents of the taxing state, are quite immaterial. domicile is the single controlling consideration in this situation, as it is in the case of the taxation of income derived from activities outside the state. lawrence v. state tax commission, 286 u. s. 276 , 286 u. s. 279 ; new york ex rel. cohn v. graves, 300 u. s. 308 . appellants contend, however, that, at the time of the execution of the trust agreement, there was no taxable transfer to the sons; that their interests were wholly speculative and contingent, and did not become taxable until they became vested interests, and that new jersey has not.....

Jhunni Lal and ors. Vs. Ghasi and ors.

Court : Allahabad

Reported in : AIR1943All302

.....the wealth of the country and enable them to pay their rent without which he cannot pay his revenue. what are reasonable facilities is a question of fact. the learned judge seems to have a vague appreciation of this argument because, although the points for decision deal with possession of the disputed plot within 12 years, he ends his judgment by saying that the plot is appurtenant to the defendants' cultivatory holding. this means that the plot is necessary to the defendants for carrying on the occupations which are connected with their cultivation. these occupations differ from district to district and have become more elaborate during the last 20 years owing to the enormous increase in acreage of sugarcane cultivation. it has not been satisfactorily proved that the constructions on this plot are appurtenant to the defendants' holding. i, therefore, remand the suit for finding on this issue: 'whether the constructions whatever they may be, on plot no. 907/1 are necessary to the defendants' cultivatory holding.' evidence can be given by both parties.3. as regards the considerable area said to be about 26 yards by 14 yards which has been utilised by the defendants and other.....

Ahmed Mia and ors. Vs. Emperor

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : AIR1944Cal243

.....respect to the allegations of both parties and amir hossain and others were tried in a counter case. it is clear from this brief statement of the facts of the case that the investigating officer who went on the scene very shortly after the occurrence was perhaps the most important witness in the case. he gave evidence in the sessions trial. the appellants requested the court by a petition to direct the investigating officer to come with the police diary of the counter case, so that he may be contradicted, if necessary, as regards his statements as to what he saw at the time of his investigation by reference to his own record of what he saw in the police diary. the learned judge rejected the petition stating that section 162, criminal p. c, rendered such a statement inadmissible in evidence.3. in our judgment, the learned judge was wrong in refusing this prayer of the accused. section 162, criminal p.c., has nothing whatsoever to do with this matter. that section relates to statements made by persons to police officers in the course of investigation. what the appellants were wanting to make use of was not a statement of a person to a police officer but a statement of the police.....

Baldeo Das on Behalf of Kamlapati Tewari Vs. Emperor

Court : Allahabad

Reported in : AIR1943All331

.....not made till 28th april the ordinance could not adversely affect the application. the answer to this contention is furnished by section 3 of the ordinance which is mandatory and enjoins that an order under rule 26 cannot be called in question on the ground that it was in excess of the rulemaking power given by the defence of india act. in view of section 3 it is my duty to hold that para. (x) of sub-section (2), as now substituted, all along existed in the defence of india act and, in view of that clause, the central government was competent to enact rule 26. that being so, it is impossible to hold that the detention of kamlapati tewari is illegal. in this view of the matter this application must fail and is dismissed.13. n. b. -- leave to appeal to the federal court is granted.

M. Karunakara Menon and anr. Vs. E. Sankaran Unni, the Official Receiv ...

Court : Chennai

Reported in : AIR1943Mad644; (1943)2MLJ134

.....of discharge had been granted to the insolvent. it was then contended on behalf of the mortgagee that the learned district judge in 1937 had in fact no jurisdiction to deal with the appeal and still less had his successor any jurisdiction to deal with the appeal in 1941. the moment the absolute order of discharge had been granted, the appeal automatically abated. the learned district judge held against this view of the law and then considering the case on the merits, has annulled the mortgage deed in so far as the insolvent's half share in the mortgage right under ex. iv is concerned. this is a petition against that order of the district judge filed by the transferee. the official receiver, who is the main respondent in this petition, has not appeared.2. it seems to me that there are no sufficient grounds for holding the view that the granting of an absolute order of discharge has any immediate effect upon any proceedings which may be pending under either section 53 or section 54 of the insolvency act, whether in the insolvency court itself or in the court of appeal. naturally if such objections were pending in the insolvency court, the insolvency court would take due notice.....

Thadigadapa Jayalakshmamma and anr. Vs. Guntupalli Ramachandrayya

Court : Chennai

Reported in : AIR1943Mad711; (1943)2MLJ285

.....be doubted for a moment that an enforceable contract of sale in respect of the property in favour of a third party is a serious defect in the seller's title to the property as the sale would be liable to be defeated if the transferee had notice of such contract (see section 40 and the illustration). the saving in this provision of a transferee for consideration and without notice of the contract is an equitable provision made for his protection and cannot have the effect of making the vendor's title capable of being validly sold. it would be a strange thing, as it seems to me, to hold that the petitioners had a ' saleable interest' in the property in question on the relevant dates when a sale to any other person after due disclosure as provided in section 55(1)(a)would be liable to be defeated at the instance of the respondent. it follows that the petitioner was not an agriculturist within the meaning of section 3(ii) of the madras agriculturists' relief act on the material dates and his application for relief under the act must fail.4. the petiton is dismissed with costs.

Adimoola Padayachi Vs. Kasi Ammal and anr.

Court : Chennai

Reported in : AIR1943Mad701; (1943)2MLJ178

.....evidence of any such consent. the learned judge has stated that the widow appears to have given her consent. perhaps it was inferred from the fact that at the subsequent partition she was accepting certain benefits from one of the parties who had been party to the division of the properties. in the present case, as already stated there was no positive evidence that the widow consented to it. but her conduct can give rise only to one presumption and that is that she had no objection to the partition and that she had from her point of view abandoned the properties. in considering the question of estoppel it is the conduct of the parties to the partition that is material, and in the present case they did act on the assumption that the reversion had opened and that they had the right of dividing the properties although the partition took place during the lifetime of the widow. having behaved in that fashion and having divided the properties they continued to enjoy the shares allotted to them from 1916 until the date of the suit from which this second appeal arises. adimoola is certainly estopped from disputing the partition and in dealing with the question of such estoppel it.....

In Re: V. Sundaram Aiyar

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1943)2MLJ107

.....of separate licenses. i am not able to find any provision warranting such a view being taken of the rights of the municipality.3. i could not however be understood as laying down the law generally and for all cases. where the melting of lead even for lino-type machines is done on a huge commercial scale, the municipal council may be able to insist on a license. where the machinery is not covered by a license already issued, probably they could ask for a license fee, not merely for authorising the installation of the machine but also for permitting the particular process of lead melting. but on the facts of this case, i am of the opinion that the conviction is not warranted. it is set aside and the fine, if paid, will be refunded.

Minor Munusamy Mudaliar Vs. Chengalvaraya Naicker and ors.

Court : Chennai

Reported in : AIR1943Mad645; (1943)2MLJ133

.....out in order vii, rule 11, civil procedure code. the non-production of a document on which the plaintiff relies is not one of the reasons. in rule 14 of the same 6rder a plaintiff is required to produce in court when the plaint is presented any document sued upon which is in his possession or power; but even if the decree be considered to be such a document, the punishment for the non-production of such a document is not the rejection of the plaint, but that set out in rule 18 of order vii, viz., that the document shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.3. as the plaint was wrongly rejected, the review application should have been allowed. this petition is therefore allowed, the review application granted, and the plaint ordered to be received by the court. there will be no order as to costs.