Reported in : 2006(6)ALD685; 2007(1)ALT253
.....permitted to plead one legal relationship before the land ceiling authorities and another relationship when the matter comes to the civil court. the fact that defendants 1 and 2 were not parties to the land ceiling proceedings does not make any difference inasmuch as they are claiming through late janardhan as his legal heirs. further, they had the benefit of the said plea taken before the land ceiling authorities. if indeed they can be permitted to blow hot and cold, it will become necessary for the court to consider whether the matter should not be brought to the notice of the district collector or the concerned land ceiling authorities for resumption of the land in excess of one standard holding. / am, therefore, in disagreement with both the courts on this question and i hold that as a matter of public policy, the parties cannot be permitted to raise pleas which are contrary to the cases set up by them or their predecessors in title before the land ceiling authorities. on that basis, the defendants cannot be permitted to reopen the question of the plaintiffs adoption at this juncture. i, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case with regard to his.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2006(6)ALD776; 2007(1)ALT257
.....first respondent deposed as p.w.1 and he filed two sale deeds, marked as exs.a-1 and a-9, a bunch of cist receipts marked as exs.a-3 to a-8 and an order passed in i.p. no. 12 of 1972 marked as ex.a-2. on behalf of the appellants herein, dws.1 and 2 were examined and ex.b-1, certified copy of the mortgage deed, dated 24-1-1965, was filed. the suit was decreed and the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed.8. the main contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the suit for partition filed by the first respondent was not maintainable, since all the coparceners of the joint family were not impleaded. it is no doubt true that in a suit for partition, all the coparceners must be impleaded. the reason is that the availability of the items of property for partition and ascertainment of shares would be possible, only, if all the concerned are impleaded in the suit. in the instant case, the first respondent did not claim the status of a coparcener or co-sharer. he purchased the shares of appellants 1 and 2 herein through sale deeds, marked as exs.a-1 and a-9. he has stepped into their shoes. initially, he pleaded that the possession of the property was delivered to.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : [2006]148STC616(AP)
.....credit to while determining the tax liability of the petitioner. this contention of the petitioner is on the legal premise that notwithstanding the fact that the works contract was executed by the petitioner through a sub-contractor, there can only be one taxable event for the purpose of the apvat act, if the vat act were to be consistent with the scheme of the constitution, having regard to the language of entry 54 of list ii of the seventh schedule read with article 366(29a)(b) of the constitution, and therefore, tax can be collected only once for such taxable event. the objection of the petitioner was not accepted, resulting in the impugned assessment and demand. hence, the writ petition.5. admittedly, the apvat act, 2005, is made by the legislature of andhra pradesh in exercise of the authority vested in it by virtue of entry 54 of list ii of the seventh schedule to the constitution, which authorises the state to levy tax on the sale or purchase of goods. the scope and amplitude of this entry has been the subject-matter of incessant litigation for the last half a century in this country.6. whether the goods utilised by a contractor in the execution of a building contract.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : I(2007)ACC349; 2007(1)ALD333; 2007(1)ALT59
.....from granting a well deserved relief having regard to the powers vested in it under order 41 rule 33 and also under section 151 of c.p.c. in the facts of that case, it was held that it was a fit case for enhancement of compensation, even without a cross-appeal.16. the charge-sheet ex. a-4, the wound certificate ex. a-3 and the case-sheet ex. x-1, show that the claimant was aged 30 years by the date of accident. ex. a-4 further shows that her calling was coolie. it is also in the evidence of pw -1 that she is unmarried and she was eking out livelihood by going to coolie work earning rs. 50/-per day. the tribunal assessed the daily income of pw -1 by way of coolie work at rs. 30/- per day and accordingly assessed the loss of past earnings. the said estimation of daily income is quite reasonable. as per the second schedule to motor vehicles act, 1988, suitable multiplier for a person aged 30 years is 18. when the same is applied, the loss of income for the claimant comes to rs. 1,92,400/- (rs. 900/- per month 12 18 multiplier). inasmuch as, the permanent disability suffered by the claimant is estimated medically at 65%, the loss of earnings to that extent comes to rs......
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2007(1)ALD444; 2007(2)ALT210
.....was not at palakonda at anytime, the court below has rightly dismissed the petition and so the order under revision needs no interference.3. the fact that the o.p. is still pending is not denied or disputed. since the case is a reference under section 30 of the land acquisition act, the provisions of cpc apply to those proceedings. so if statements of the claimants are not filed within the time granted, they would naturally be set ex parte under rule 7 of order 9 cpc.4. in arjun singh v. mohindra kumar and ors. : [1964]5scr946 , the apex court held:in its essence order under order 9 rule 7 is directed to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings by penalizing improper dilatoriness calculated merely to prolong the litigation. it does not put an end to the litigation nor does it involve the determination of any issue in controversy in the suit. besides, it is obvious that the proceeding is of a very summary nature and this is evident from the fact that as contrasted with order ix rule 7, 'refusing to set back the clock'. it is, therefore, manifest that the code proceeds upon the view not imparting any finality to the determination of any issues of fact on which the court's.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2007(2)ALD94; 2007(2)ALT636
.....226 of the constitution of india. there is no indication to the effect that the procedure in the c.p.c., does not apply to execution proceedings. in fact, it would be contradiction in terms. the slight doubt that may linger, in this regard, stands clarified with rule 18-a of order xxvi c.p.c., which reads as under:application of order to execution proceedings:- the provisions of this order shall apply, so far as may be, to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.it does not appear that the attention of this court was drawn to the said proceedings, when it was decided in b. narasappa's case (supra). in view of the specific provision referred to above, the said order deserves to be treated as per incuriam. further, in chakka ranga rao's case (supra), this court took note of rule 18-a of order xxvi of c.p.c., and held that it is permissible in execution proceedings also, to appoint a commissioner.5. the second aspect is about the justification in appointment of a commissioner. the decree in the instant case is for recovery of possession. the property, which is to be recovered, and the purport of mandatory injunction is clearly described in the decree itself. the respondents.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2007(3)ALD57
.....was negligent. had the deceased not kept the door open, he would not have fallen down from the lorry when the driver applied a sudden brake. in the facts and circumstances of the case, the deceased can be said to be guilty of 25% contributory negligence but not 50% contributory negligence as held by the tribunal.8. so i hold that the accident occurred due to 25% contributory negligence of the deceased and due to 75% of negligence of the driver of the lorry belonging to the 1st respondent. the point is answered accordingly.9. holding that the deceased was earning rs. 6,000/- p.m. as cleaner and was contributing rs. 450/- per month or rs. 5,400/-per annum to the appellants and fixing the multiplier as 16.51 on the basis that the deceased was aged 30 years, the tribunal awarded rs.89,154/- towards pecuniary damages and rs. 15,000/- towards non-pecuniary damages and rs. 7,500/- towards loss of consortium to the 2nd respondent making a total of rs. 1,11,654/- which is just and reasonable. so rs. 1,11,700/- would be the compensation to which the appellants would have been entitled to.10. but as i held that the accident occurred due to 25% contributory negligence of the deceased,.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2007(1)AWC727
.....houses. merely because house was situate at maalgodam road it could not be inferred that it was commercial. houses also require roads. the mere fact that a house is adjacent to a road does not convert it into a commercial accommodation. there is no finding that on the road in question i.e. maalgodam road there were shops adjacent to the house in dispute.3. there is one more aspect of the matter-which requires consideration. if from the perusal of the sale deed itself it was clear that property was commercial however, stamp duty had been paid on residential basis then sub-registrar should not have registered the deed. sub-registrar himself merely on the basis of the deed recommended for initiation of proceedings for determination and realization of deficiency in stamp duty. in such situation action should have been taken against the sub-registrar by the district magistrate for illegally registering the sale deed at the first instance. however, as the matter is quite old i do not consider it appropriate for issuing direction for taking action against the sub-registrar concerned. however, in future district magistrates/collectors must be particular in this regard. if a.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 2007(1)AWC53
.....that the status of the petitioner being inadvertently mentioned as 'married' he will not be considered for grant of licence.in the light of the fact that the petitioner is still a bachelor, it is directed that in case the petitioner is otherwise eligible, his case shall be considered provided the petitioner files a correct affidavit indicating not only his marital status, but also the fact whether any of his relative has been granted licence as per appendix-a. sri anil kumar states that he will inform the authority concerned.with these observations and consent of the parties, the writ petition is finally disposed of. 4. the aforesaid judgment cannot be said to be a binding precedent for the reasons that it was passed with the consent of the parties without referring to the specific terms and conditions contained in the relevant advertisement. those terms and conditions and their effect has been dismissed by us in the case of smt. omitri rai v. general manager and anr. (supra) and in this view of the matter the judgment and order dated 10.10.2006 is per incuriam and cannot be treated as a binding precedent.5. in this way, there is no manifest error of law apparent on the face.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : [2006(111)FLR1065]
.....years, he should have continued till 13.6.2005. the ground taken in the writ petition is that in the scheme as provided in the relevant government order as well as in the relevant rules of the year 1981, acceptance of the option to retire at 58 years could have only been done by the deputy director and communication thereof was necessary to the employee concerned. mere signature of the district inspector of schools on such option as was shown in the present case on 10.7.2002 could not be taken neither as acceptance nor could any kind of finality be attached to such counter signature.5. in support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a full bench decision of this court in the case of smt. prabha kakkar v. joint director of education and ors. reported in 2000 (2) esc 1118 (all.).6. in view of the full bench decision in the case of smt. prabha kakkar (supra), the present petition is liable to be allowed. as the order passed by the district inspector of schools dated 10.7.2002 cannot be said to be full-fledged acceptance of the option to retire voluntarily, the petitioner will be deemed to be continued till attaining the age of 62 years as his.....
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